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Frontiers are indeed the razor’s edge on which hang suspended the 
modern issues of war or peace, of life or death to nations.1 
We have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no white 
man’s foot has ever trod; we have been giving away mountains and riv-
ers and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small impediment that 
we never knew exactly where the mountains and rivers and lakes 
were.2 
Three degrees of latitude upset the whole of jurisprudence and one me-
ridian determines what is true…. It is a funny sort of justice whose lim-
its are marked by a river; true on this side of the Pyrenees, false on the 
other.3 
A place on the map is also a place in history.4 
I. INTRODUCTION 
hen the U.S. decided to inject another 30,000 troops into the 
current Afghan war, now in its ninth year, The New York Times 
emphasized that “[i]t’s not about Afghanistan. It’s about a people strad-
dling a border.”5 It went on to explain: 
The land is not on any map, but it’s where leaders of Al Qaeda and the 
Taliban both hide. It straddles 1000 miles of the 1600-mile Afghan-
Pakistani border. It is inhabited by the ethnic Pashtun, a fiercely inde-
pendent people that number 12 million on the Afghan side and 27 mil-
lion on the Pakistani side. They have a language (Pashto), an elaborate 
traditional code of legal and moral conduct (Pashtunwali), a habit of 
crossing the largely unmarked border at will, and a centuries-long his-
tory of foreign interventions that ended badly for the foreigners.6 
The report adds: “[T]he Pashtun themselves have never paid the boun-
dary much regard since it was drawn by a British diplomat, Mortimer 
Durand, in 1893. ‘They don’t recognize the border. They never have. 
                                                                                                             
 1. George Nathaniel Curzon, Lord Curzon of Kedleston, as the Romanes Lecture 
(Nov. 2, 1907), in FRONTIERS 7 (Greenwood Press 2d ed. 2006) (1908). 
 2. Lord Salisbury, quoted in, J. C. ANENE, THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES OF 
NIGERIA 1885-1960, at 3 (1970) (quoting The Geographical Journal, vol. xxciii, Proceed-
ings, Mar. 9, 1914). 
 3. BLAISE PASCAL, PENSÉES 46 (A. J. Krailsheimer trans., 1966). 
 4. ADRIENNE RICH, BLOOD, BREAD & POETRY 1979-1985, at 212 (1986). 
 5. Scott Shane, The War in Pashtunistan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2009, at WR 1 (sub-
title of print version). See also Eric Schmitt, Cables Detail Envoy’s Worry on Karzai 
Role, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2010, at A1; William Dalrymple, The Ghosts of Gandamak, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2010, at WK 9. 
 6. Shane, supra note 5, at WK 1. 
W 
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They never will.’”7 An American military officer complains: “The only 
ones who recognized the border were us, with our G.P.S.”8 Some de-
scribe the Durand Line as one “drawn on water.”9 Perhaps, but it has 
been on fire for over a hundred years. 
 
 Fig. 1. The Durand Line and the Pashtun Areas10 
For over a century, the Durand Line and the border region between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan has been the epicenter of political and military 
conflicts in the region and beyond. As the current cycle of wars in and 
around Afghanistan, which started with the Soviet invasion in 1979,11 
enters its thirty-first year, this line continues to both create and aggravate 
security challenges. The U.S. Army’s official history of the war in Afg-
hanistan, covering the period from 2001 to 2005, observes that “the sin-
gle greatest obstacle to conceptualizing . . . [this war] in a holistic sense 
was ambivalence . . . about . . . nation-building . . . [in] Afghanistan 
                                                                                                             
 7. Id.(quoting Shuja Nawaz, director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Coun-
cil, Washington, D.C.). Pashtun, Pakhtun, Pashtoon, and Pathan are among the various 
designations used for this ethnic group. I will use the term Pashtun, unless quoting from 
or citing other materials. 
 8. Id. at WK 1. 
 9. ZAHID HUSSAIN, FRONTLINE PAKISTAN: THE STRUGGLE WITH MILITANT ISLAM 210 
n.12 (2007) [hereinafter HUSSAIN, FRONTLINE PAKISTAN]. 
 10. Shane, supra note 5, at WK1 (map appears to the left of the article as available at 
www.nytimes.com). 
 11. See SHUJA NAWAZ, CROSSED SWORDS: PAKISTAN, ITS ARMY, AND THE WARS 
WITHIN 369–79 (2008) [hereinafter NAWAZ, CROSSED SWORDS]. 
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[that] remained a failed state.”12 It bemoans that while “the need for a 
plan that …offered a clear vision for this transition should have been ob-
vious,” instructions were to “avoid being enmeshed in nation building.”13 
It concludes that: 
The Afghan experience reinforces the critical point that regardless of 
the nature of the Army’s future campaigns, U.S. soldiers will almost 
inevitably interact with foreign cultures. If these campaigns are focused 
on nation building, cultural awareness will become not just a necessary 
but perhaps a critical skill like marksmanship or land navigation.14 
These observations raise many questions about the relationship be-
tween contested borders, nation-building, failed states, cultural differ-
ence, and foreign interventions. In particular, they put into contention the 
elusive search for the “nation-state,” a term absent in any English lan-
guage dictionary before 1950.15 In response to these vexing questions, 
we are offered a “bifurcated world . . . inhabited by Hegel’s and Fu-
kuyama’s Last Man . . . [and] Hobbes’ First Man.”16 Binary geographies 
of danger and safety are deployed that see bloody boundaries between a 
“functioning core” and a “non-integrating gap,” with the “disconnected-
ness” between the two designated as the “ultimate enemy.” 17 An in-
verted map of the world is unfolded to offer prescriptions for 
“[g]eostrategic success,” namely, “prevent collusion and maintain securi-
ty dependence among the vassals . . . keep tributaries pliant and pro-
tected, and . . . keep the barbarians from coming together.”18 A “new pa-
radigm” is enunciated for a war of “uncertain duration” against “the 
enemies of civilization.”19 One that “renders obsolete [and] . . . quaint” 
                                                                                                             
 12. DONALD P. WRIGHT ET AL., A DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR: THE U.S. ARMY IN 
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), OCT. 2001–SEP. 2005, at 326–27 (2009) (empha-
sis added), available at http://documents.nytimes.com/a-different-kind-of-war#p=1. 
 13. Id. at 327 (emphasis added). 
 14. Id. at 336 (emphasis added). 
 15. John D. Kelly & Martha Kaplan, Legal Fictions after Empire, in THE STATE OF 
SOVEREIGNTY: TERRITORIES, LAWS, POPULATIONS 169, 170 (Douglas Howland & Luise 
White eds., 2009). 
 16. ROBERT KAPLAN, THE COMING ANARCHY: SHATTERING THE DREAMS OF THE POST 
COLD WAR 24 (2001). 
 17. THOMAS P. M. BARNETT, THE PENTAGON’S NEW MAP: WAR AND PEACE IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 26, 124 (2004). 
 18. ZBIGNEW BREZEZINSKI, THE GRAND CHESSBOARD: AMERICAN PRIMACY AND ITS 
GEOSTRATEGIC  IMPERATIVES  32, 40, 215 (1997). 
 19. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE U.S. ¶4 
(2002); Stephen P. Marks, Branding the “War on Terrorism”: Is there a “New Para-
digm” of International Law?, 12 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 71, 89 (2006). 
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established rules of war.20 This article argues that the Afghan war, like 
many of today’s international conflicts, is rooted in contested borders 
that have not stood the test of time. Contested borders require that we 
“rethink the lazy separations between past, present, and future.”21 Con-
flicts that appear as new iterations of the binary-divides between civi-
lized versus uncivilized, reason versus faith, and modernity versus fun-
damentalism, only confirm the “presence of the past.”22 Disruptions of 
the triumphal march of civilization, reason, and modernity necessitate 
that we shift our focus from “present futures to present pasts.”23 Howev-
er, any effort to look back and bring into relief the history that animates 
the present confronts “a privilege of power too often unseen: the luxury 
of not having had to know, a parochialism and insularity that those on the 
margins can neither enjoy nor afford.”24 Often, contemporary ills have 
their roots in past policies and actions. When faced with intractable con-
flicts, it is useful to heed to the admonition: “Always historicize!”25 To 
understand why the escalating Afghan war remains intractable it is bene-
ficial to inquire into when, why, and how borders, nations, and states 
took shape in that region. It is also important to understand how modern 
international law, both in its incipient and mature stages, is implicated in 
designs that set the region into its current, unhappy course. 
This article addresses questions of borders, cultures, nations, states, 
and foreign interventions underscored by the current war in the Afgha-
nistan-Pakistan region by exploring the genealogy of the Durand Line, its 
conflict-ridden career, and the attendant role of the law. In this frame, 
this article interrogates modern law’s subscription to a “territorialist 
epistemology.”26 Part II inventories nineteenth century constructs of in-
                                                                                                             
 20. Memorandum from White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales to President George 
W. Bush (Jan. 25, 2002), available  at http://www.scribd.com/doc/8947254/Gonzales-
Torture-Memo. 
 21. DEREK GREGORY, THE COLONIAL PRESENT 7 (2004) [hereinafter GREGORY, 
COLONIAL PRESENT] 
 22. Etienne Balibar, Racism & Nationalism, in RACE, NATION, CLASS: AMBIGUOUS 
IDENTITIES 38, 38 (Etienne Balibar & Immanuel Wallerstein eds., 1991). 
 23. Andreas Huyssen, Present Pasts: Media, Politics, Amnesia, in GLOBALIZATION 57 
(Arjun Appadurai ed., 2001). 
 24. Roxanne L. Euben, The New Manichaeans, 5 THEORY & EVENT 1, 1 (2002). 
 25. FREDERICK JAMESON, THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS 9 (1981). 
 26. WILLEM VAN SCHENDEL, THE BENGAL BORDERLAND: BEYOND STATE AND NATION 
IN SOUTH ASIA 5 (2005). This entails a “transposition of the historically unique territorial 
structure of the modern interstate system into a generalized model of sociospatial organi-
zation, whether with reference to political, societal, economic, or cultural processes.” 
Nein Brenner, Beyond State-Centrism? Space, Territoriality, and Geographical Scale in 
Globalization Studies, 28 THEORY & SOC’Y 39, 48 (1999). In this schema, “[a] nation can 
be imagined without a word or other symbol or color on a map, but this is impossible if 
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ternational law, geography, geopolitics, and borders that formed the scaf-
folding that made the drawing of the Durand Line possible. It shows that 
drawing lines, both actual and metaphoric, constitutes modern legal or-
ders, particularly international law. Part III narrates the story of the de-
marcation of this line in the midst of imperial rivalries and the role it has 
played in colonial and postcolonial operations of power. It focuses on 
nation-building and security dilemmas of postcolonial states that are im-
prisoned in territorial straitjackets bequeathed by colonial cartographies. 
Part IV examines how international law preserves contested borders be-
queathed by colonialism, and thereby precludes imaginative flowerings 
of self-determination in tune with identities and aspirations of communi-
ties located within and beyond received colonial boundaries. Part V 
draws conclusions about the mutually constitutive role of colonialism 
and international law in ordering spaces and subjects. It posits that con-
ceptual and doctrinal frames of international law remain tangled in its 
colonial lineage, and thus accentuate postcolonial dilemmas and con-
flicts. 
II. SCAFFOLDINGS OF COLONIAL CARTOGRAPHIES 
Just as none of us is outside or beyond geography, none of us is com-
pletely free from the struggle over geography. That struggle is complex 
and interesting because it is not only about soldiers and cannons but al-
so about ideas, about form, about images and imaginings.27 
Drawing boundaries is the inaugural gesture of the law, while po-
licing boundaries is its routine function. The genesis of law signals 
that “[t]he primordial scene of the nomos opens with a drawing of 
a line in the soil . . . to mark the space of one’s own.”28 Modern 
law’s insistent claims of its universality notwithstanding, lines of 
demarcation that separate legality from illegality often create zones 
where bodies and spaces are placed on the other side of universali-
ty, a “moral and legal no man’s land, where universality finds its 
                                                                                                             
boundary lines, the symbol which forms the entity of a map of a nation, are excluded.” 
THONGCHAI WINICHAKUL, SIAM MAPPED: A HISTORY OF THE GEO-BODY OF A NATION 56 
(1994). 
 27. EDWARD W. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM 7 (1993) [hereinafter SAID, 
CULTURE]. 
 28. Cornelia Vismann, Starting from Scratch: Concepts of Order in No Man’s Land, 
in WAR, VIOLENCE AND THE MODERN CONDITION 46, 46 (Bernd Hüppauf ed., 1997). 
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spatial limit.” 29 Material and discursive orders that enjoy hegemo-
ny in any setting, fashion and enable instruments to draw these 
lines and carve out such zones. The story of the Durand Line testi-
fies to this phenomenon. 
The Durand Line was drawn by a colonial power in the nineteenth cen-
tury, which was a defining phase in the consolidation of modern regimes 
of knowledge, along with the suturing of epistemology with the state.30 
Therefore, it is critical to identify the conceptual ensemble that furnished 
the scaffolding for such a venture. It is the Author’s position that the 
conceptual and discursive apparatus of international law, modern geo-
graphy, geopolitics, and borders are interwoven in the enabling frame 
that made the drawing of this conflict-ridden dividing line possible. 
                                                                                                             
 29. Denise Ferreira de Silva, Towards a Critique of the Socio-Logos of Justice: The 
Analytics of Raciality and the Production of Universality, 7 SOC. IDENTITIES 421, 422 
(2001). 
 30. For the mutually constitutive roles of knowledge and power, see MICHEL 
FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE (Colin Gordon ed., trans., Leo Marshall, John Mepham, 
& Kate Soper trans., Pantheon Books 1980) (1972). Thomas Richards argues that 
The thread uniting the thought of . . . [leading nineteenth century intellectuals] 
was the idea that knowledge is inconceivable without the state: that the ques-
tion of the state is a question of knowledge, especially scientific knowledge; 
that the classing of knowledge must be underwritten and directed by the state in 
its various capacities; that all epistemology became and must remain state 
epistemology in an economy of controlled information. 
THOMAS RICHARDS, THE IMPERIAL ARCHIVE: KNOWLEDGE AND THE FANTASY OF EMPIRE 
74 (1993). Here, I am also guided by the work of critical geographers regarding space 
and scale as actively produced through practices that are simultaneously material and 
meaningful. Of particular significance in this work is the mutually constitutive role of 
time and space. See generally HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE (Donald 
Nicholson-Smith trans., 1991); EDWARD SOJA, POSTMODERN GEOGRAPHIES: THE 
REASSERTION OF SPACE IN CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY (1989); SPACE AND SOCIAL THEORY: 
INTERPRETING MODERNITY AND POSTMODERNITY (Georges Benko & Ulf Strohmayer eds., 
1997) (examining geography in a postmodern landscape with particular attention to re-
presentations in human and social sciences); PLACE AND POLITICS OF IDENTITY (Michael 
Keith & Steve Pile eds., 1993); Fernando Coronil, Beyond Occidentalism: Towards Non-
imperial Geohistorical Categories, 11 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY  51 (1996) (discussing 
non-cartographic ways of mapping the world); Fernando Coronil, Towards a Critique of 
Globalcentrism: Speculations on Capitalism’s Nature, 12 PUBLIC CULTURE 351 (2000) 
(exploring the impact of globalization on reordering geohistorical units). 
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A. International Law and Differentiated Sovereignty 
No sooner was a new world “discovered,” than a line, patition del mar 
oceano, was drawn by the Treaty of Tordesillas on June 7, 1494.31 This 
line divided the world beyond Europe between Portugal and Spain, and 
supplemented Pope Alexander VI’s edict Inter caetera divinae of May 4, 
1494, with an agreement between sovereigns.32 The right of two royal 
houses of Europe over the division of the non-European world as “lords 
with full, free, and every kind of power, authority and jurisdiction”33 now 
stood grounded both in divine sanction and sovereign will and consent.34 
This inaugural act of the incipient global order injected colonialism into 
the genetic code of modern international law.35  The “amity lines,” in-
itiated by a secret clause of the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis of 1559, in-
stitutionalized a differentiation between the European “sphere of peace 
and the law of nations from an overseas sphere in which there was nei-
                                                                                                             
 31. The line ran from the North Pole to the South Pole, approximately through the 
middle of the Atlantic Ocean. Portugal and Spain agreed that all newly discovered territo-
ries west of the line would belong to Spain and those east of the line to Portugal. 
EUROPEAN TREATIES BEARING ON THE HISTORY OF THE U.S. AND ITS DEPENDENCIES TO 
1648, at 85, 170–71 (Frances Gardiner Davenport ed., 1967) (1917). Subsequently, the 
Treaty of Saragossa (1526), drew the Molucca Line through the Pacific Ocean along the 
135th meridian. Id. See also ANTHONY PAGDEN, SPANISH IMPERIALISM AND THE POLITICAL 
IMAGINATION (1990); CARL SCHMITT, THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW OF THE JUS PUBLICUM  EUROPAEUM 89 (G. L. Ulmen trans., 2003) (1950). 
 32. SCHMITT, supra note 31, at 88–89; Boaventura de Souza Santos, Beyond Abyssal 
Thinking, EUROZINE 3 (June 29, 2007), http://www.eurozine.com/pdf/2007-06-29-
santos-en.pdf; J. H. ELLIOTT, IMPERIAL SPAIN, 1469-1716, at 57–58  (1964); MARK 
COCKER, RIVERS OF BLOOD, RIVERS OF GOLD: EUROPE’S CONQUEST OF INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES 14–15 (1998). 
 33. Tr. “dominos cum plena libera et omnimoda potestate, auctoritate et jurisdic-
tione.” The Papal edict besides seeking expansion of fides catholica and Christiana lex, 
and conversion of barbarian peoples, expressly effected donatio of territories, as in clas-
sic feudal law. See SCHMITT, supra note 31, at 91 n.7. 
 34. The treaty both “affirmed the importance of Catholicism as a rationale for empire 
and undermined papal authority by authorizing sovereigns to act on their own to oppose 
threats by infidels.” LAUREN BENTON, A SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND 
GEOGRAPHY IN EUROPEAN EMPIRES, 1400-1900, at 22 n.62 (2010). For the tension be-
tween canon law and secular authority in early European colonial expansion, see JAMES 
MULDOON, POPES, LAWYERS, AND INFIDELS (1979). 
 35. Modern international law, therefore, “is a world historic result of the early coloni-
al experience of transatlantic and eastern trade . . . it is the dialectical result of the very 
process of conflictual, expanding inter-polity interaction in an age of early state forms 
and mercantile colonialism . . . . [I]nternational law is colonialism.” CHINA MIÉVILLE, 
BETWEEN EQUAL RIGHTS: A MARXIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 168–69 (2005). 
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ther peace nor law.”36 These “amity lines,” which mandated peaceful 
cooperation in the region within their bounds and gave license to un-
bridled conflict without, gave rise to the maxim: “Beyond the equator 
there are no sins.”37 In the new global order, “[e]verything that occurred 
‘beyond the line’ remained outside the legal, moral, and political values 
recognized on this side of the line.”38 In this zone, “beyond the line” and 
“beyond the equator,” doctrines of “discovery,” “terra nullius,” and 
“anima nullius” flourished.39 The career of modern international law is 
the story of making, maintaining, and managing this enduring line. 
                                                                                                             
 36. A. Claire Cutler, Towards a Radical Political Economy Critique of Transnational 
Economic Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE LEFT: RE-EXAMINING MARXIST LEGACIES 
199, 205 (Susan Marks ed., 2008), (citation omitted). For details of the amity lines, see 
SCHMITT, supra note 31, at 92–99. 
 37. Quoted in, SCHMITT, supra note 31, at 90 n.6. See also Santos, supra note 32, at 
30 n.10; Eliga Gould, Zones of Law, Zones of Violence: The Legal Geography of the 
British Atlantic, circa 1772, 60 WILLIAM & MARY Q. 471 (2003) (discussing the legal 
justifications of colonialism). One can trace the emergence of spheres of influence in the 
nineteenth century to the sixteenth century amity lines. For the status of such spheres of 
influence, see PAUL KEAL, UNSPOKEN RULES AND SUPERPOWER DOMINANCE 179-192 
(1983); SCHMITT, supra note 31 at 281–94. 
 38. SCHMITT, supra note 31, at 94. In 1906, it was pointed out that “[t]he color line 
belts the world,” serving the same purpose. W. E. B. Du Bois, The Color Line Belts the 
World, in AMERICAN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT  313 (Andreas Hess ed., 2003). 
 39. Santos finds the idea of anima nullius, colonized people as empty receptacles, 
embedded  in Pope Paul III’s bull Sublimis Deus of 1537, that declared that indigenous 
people of the colonies were “truly men . . . [but] they are not capable of understanding the 
Catholic Faith but . . . desire exceedingly to receive it.” Santos, supra note 32, at 30 n.12. 
See also JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004). Pope Paul 
III reading of these “empty receptacles” is more optimistic than that of Lord Coke, who 
said in the landmark Calvin Case of 1602, that “if a Christian King should conquer a 
kingdom of an infidel, and bring them under submission, there ipso facto the laws of the 
infidel are abrogated, for that they be not only against Christianity, but against the law of 
God and of nature, contained in the Decalogue.” 1 SIR EDWARD COKE, THE SELECTED 
WRITINGS & SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD pt. 7 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003), available at 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/911/106335. See also, Robert A. Williams, The Algebra of 
Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trial of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s 
Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219, 239–45 (1986). On the doctrine of territo-
rium res nullious, see PAUL KEAL, EUROPEAN CONQUEST AND THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES (2003). For British representations of empire’s “empty spaces,” see D. GRAHAM 
BURNETT, MASTERS OF ALL THEY SURVEYED: EXPLORATIONS, GEOGRAPHY, AND A BRITISH 
EL DORADO (2000). This zone “beyond the line” also furnished the constitutive grounds 
for the founding canon of liberalism, modern law, and the identity of Europe. See PETER 
FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW 45 (1993) [hereinafter FITZPATRICK, 
MYTHOLOGY]; PETER FITZPATRICK, MODERNISM AND THE GROUNDS OF LAW (2001) [he-
reinafter FITZPATRICK, MODERNISM]; DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE: 
POSTCOLONIAL THOUGHT AND HISTORICAL DIFFERENCE (2000); UDEH SING MEHTA, 
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In the nineteenth century, colonialism animated a decisive turn in the 
evolution of modern international law, even though “international law 
consistently attempts to obscure its colonial origins, [and] its connections 
with the inequalities and exploitation inherent in the colonial encoun-
ter.”40 The unquestioned universality of international law “was principal-
ly a consequence of the imperial expansion.”41 The development of mod-
ern conceptions of sovereignty and the international subject, which are 
bedrock constructs of modern international law, has little to do with the 
professed foundational concern of international law, i.e., stability of the 
relations between sovereign states.42 Rather, these constructs were fa-
shioned to manage the colonial relations of domination and racial differ-
ence.43 
Expansion of colonialism triggered a search for a legal framework that 
could legitimize the securing of a range of rights and privileges from co-
lonized and dominated polities. Recognition of some measure of sove-
reignty of the dominated polities was warranted by the need to ensure 
that the terms of colonial treaties would be honored, even though the 
terms of these treaties betrayed a lack of sovereignty and equality.44 This 
                                                                                                             
LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE: A STUDY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH LIBERAL THOUGHT 
(1999). 
 40. ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 117 (2004) [hereinafter ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM]. 
 41. Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in the 
Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 1 (1999). See also NATSU 
TAYLOR SAITO, MEETING THE ENEMY: AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 35–53 (2010). 
 42. Eurocentric expositions treat the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 as the inaugural 
moment of modern international law by bringing into alignment sovereign and territorial 
claims within Europe. For revisionist readings of the Treaty that question this understand-
ing, see STÉPHANE BEAULAC, THE POWER OF LANGUAGE IN THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE WORD SOVEREIGNTY IN BODIN AND VATTEL AND THE MYTH OF 
WESTPHALIA (2004). For the argument that sovereignty within Europe differed from Eu-
rope’s imperial sovereignty that rested not on frontiers but aimed at keeping rival imperi-
al powers out of zones and spheres of control, see CHARLES MAIER, AMONG EMPIRES: 
AMERICAN ASCENDANCY AND ITS PREDECESSORS (2006). 
 43. See Antony Anghie, Francisco de Votoria and the Colonial Origins of Interna-
tional Law, in LAWS OF THE POSTCOLONIAL 89 (E. Darian-Smith & Peter Fitzpatrick eds., 
1999); MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE & FALL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 98–178 (2001); Peter Fitzpatrick, Latin Roots: The Force of Inter-
national Law as Event, in EVENTS: THE FORCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Fleur Johns, 
Richard Joyce & Sundhya Pahuja eds., forthcoming) (on file with author). 
 44. The dilemma was that African and Asian social formations “could neither be 
ignored as States nor treated quite on the same footing of ordinary States.” T. Baty, Pro-
tectorates and Mandates, 2 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT’L L. 109, 112 (1921). See also, ANTONY 
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tension raised anew the question of what entities were eligible to be re-
garded as proper subjects of international law.45 In response, internation-
al law jettisoned classical natural law constructs of sovereign equality, 
now considered “pseudo-metaphysical notions of what the essential qual-
ities of Statehood ought to be,”46 and turned to positivism based on ac-
tual practice of states. Frames of jus gentium, or principles of law com-
mon to all peoples, yielded to positivist ontology of law and sovereign-
ty.47 This sharp turn yielded quick results. By the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, a new construct of differential sovereignty was entrenched in inter-
national law—sovereigns and international subjects were not alike in 
terms of rights, eligibilities, and competencies. Sovereignty was now to 
be seen as a differentially distributed bundle of rights.48 Several classes 
of sovereign states were constituted—some fully sovereign, others partly 
so; some part of the “family of nations,” some outside it; some entitled to 
domination, others with minimal legal competence.49 A sliding-scale of 
“layers of sovereignty”50 emerged, stretching from “Great Powers” to 
colonies, with suzerains, protected states, and protectorates positioned in 
                                                                                                             
CARTY, THE DECAY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 65–78 (1986) (looking at diplomacy, and the 
supposedly nature of treaty obligations). 
 45. International lawyers were emphatic that “the public law . . . has always been, 
and still is, limited to the civilized and Christian people of Europe and to those of Euro-
pean origin.” HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (George Grafton 
Wilson ed., Clarendon Press 1936) (1866) (emphasis added). Furthermore, “[t]he area 
within which the law of nations operates is supposed to coincide with the area of civiliza-
tion. To be received within it is to obtain a kind of international testimony of good con-
duct and respectability.” T. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 59 (3d 
ed. 1900). 
 46. J. L. Brierly, The Shortcomings of International Law, 5 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT’L L. 4, 
13, 15 (1924). 
 47. Benton characterizes the process as one of “modified positivism,” that derived 
“not from legislation or from agreements among [European] polities but from proliferat-
ing practices and shared expectations about legal process, stretched across the centuries 
of European imperial expansion and rule.” BENTON, supra note 34, at 6. 
 48. David Kennedy, International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an 
Illusion, 17 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 99, 123 (1997). 
 49. Anghie argues that the project to align degrees of civilization with recognition by 
international law was never stable: “The ambivalent status of the non-European entity, 
outside the scope of law and yet within it, lacking international capacity and yet necessar-
ily possessing it . . . was never satisfactorily denied or resolved.” ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, 
supra note 40, at 81. 
 50. Frederick Cooper, Alternatives to Empire: France and Africa After World War II, 
in THE STATE OF SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 15, at 106; SUGATA BOSE, A HUNDRED 
HORIZONS: THE INDIAN OCEAN IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL EMPIRE 25 (2006). 
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between.51 Given that “the founding conception of late nineteenth-
century international law was not sovereignty but a collective (European) 
conscience,”52 it is no surprise that this sliding scale of sovereignty mir-
rored the Eurocentric scale of “civilization” attendant to colonialism.53 
“[P]ositivism’s triumphant suppression of the non-European world”54 
rested on the premise that “of uncivilized natives international law t[ook] 
no account.”55 No wonder then that “[t]o characterize any conduct what-
ever towards a barbarous people as a violation of the laws of nations, 
only shows that he who so speaks has never considered the subject.”56 
                                                                                                             
 51. See generally SIBA N’ZATIOULA GROVOGUI, SOVEREIGNS, QUASI SOVEREIGNS, AND 
AFRICANS: RACE AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996) (analyzing 
colonial and neocolonial strategies in the debate of sovereignty and self-determination 
within the structure and history of international order). 
 52. THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 43, at 51. 
 53. See GERRIT GONG, THE STANDARD OF ‘CIVILIZATION’ IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 
44 (1986); Anghie, Francisco de Vitoria, supra note 43; James Thuo Gathii, Geographi-
cal Hegelianism in Territorial Disputes Involving Non-European Land Relations: An 
Analysis of the Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), 15 LEIDEN 
J. INT’L L. 581 (2002); SAITO, supra note 41, at 19–34. 
 54. Anghie, Finding the Peripheries, supra note 41, at 7. 
 55. John Westlake, John Westlake on the Title to Sovereignty, in IMPERIALISM 45, 47 
(Philip D. Curtin ed., 1971). 
 56. JOHN STUART MILL, ESSAYS ON POLITICS AND CULTURE 406 (Gertrude Himmel-
farb ed., 1962). Antony Anghie captures the relationship between international law’s turn 
to positivism and a particular characterization of colonized people well: 
The violence of positivist language in relation to non-European peoples is hard 
to overlook. Positivists developed an elaborate vocabulary for denigrating these 
people, presenting them as suitable objects for conquest, and legitimizing the 
most extreme violence against them, all in the furtherance of the civilizing mis-
sion—the discharge of the white man’s burden. 
Anghie, Finding the Peripheries, supra note 41, at 7. When confronted with some 
agreement between colonizers and the colonized, international law to this day remains at 
a loss to classify their nature much less their validity. For example, in Aloeboetoe v. Suri-
name, the Inter-American Court was confronted with a 1762 agreement between the 
Dutch and the Saramakas, a tribe that lives in Surinamese territory and was formed by 
African slaves fleeing from their Dutch owners, that recognized, among other things, the 
local authority of the Saramakas over their territory. Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, Repa-
rations, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 66, OAS/ser.L/V/V./III.29, doc. 4 (Sept. 10, 1993). The ques-
tion was whether the obligations of the treaty are applicable, by succession, upon Suri-
name. The Court did “not deem it necessary to investigate whether or not that agreement 
is an international treaty.” Id. ¶ 57. It simply noted that “the Commission has pointed out 
that it does not seek to portray the Saramakas as a community that enjoys international 
status. The autonomy it claims for the tribe is one governed by domestic public law.” Id. 
¶ 58. It then indulged in a hypothetical to say that even if the agreement was an interna-
tional treaty, it “would be null and void because it contracts the norms of jus cogens su-
perveniens,” on account of providing for the capture and sale of slaves. Id. ¶ 57. 
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This muscular and positive international law at the service of states “with 
good breeding”57 categorized a confluence of people and territory as 
“backward” and legitimated colonial acquisition of “backward territo-
ry.”58 Note that in yet another deployment of the enduring civi-
lized/uncivilized binary, the constituent statute of the International Court 
of Justice (“ICJ”) mandates that judges be selected with due regard to 
“the main forms of civilizations . . . of the world,” and the Court is re-
quired to apply “the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations.”59 The ICJ has lived up to this mandate by, for example, reach-
ing out to “geographical Hegelianism” to resolve territorial disputes in 
Africa.60 
While imperatives of colonialism shaped positivist doctrines of mod-
ern international law, by the late nineteenth century they also ushered in 
a new global order where mutual rivalries among colonial powers gave 
                                                                                                             
 57. JOHN WESTLAKE, THE COLLECTED PAPERS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (L. Oppen-
heim ed., 1914). 
 58. M. F. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORIES 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEING A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO 
COLONIAL EXPANSION (1926). This was, of course, in tune with what the courts of “civi-
lized” states had held. For example, Johnson v. M’Intosh, the canonical American case 
about the legal import of discovery, had enunciated a positivist theory of law by holding 
that: 
Conquest gives a title which Courts of the conqueror cannot deny….However 
extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an inhabited country 
into conquest may appear; if the principle has been asserted in the first instance, 
and afterwards sustained; if a country has been acquired and held under it; if 
the property of the great mass of the community originates in it, it becomes the 
law of the land, and cannot be questioned. 
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 587–91 (1823). Of course, Europeans had to enforce 
their claims to lands occupied by “fierce savages . . . by the sword.” Id. at 590. See also 
Robert A. Williams, Jr., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE 
DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990) (discussing the laws and legal discourses that were 
imposed upon the New World). 
 59. Statute of the International Court of Justice, arts. 9, 38 –1c. The racialized dis-
course of civilized/uncivilized continues to cast its shadow on technologies of global 
management and the ubiquitous discourse of “failed states.” See, e.g., Antony Anghie, 
Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial Institutions, and the 
Third World, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L & POL. 243 (2000); Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the 
Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy and the Mandate system of the 
League of Nations, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L & POL. 513 (2002); Ruth Gordon, Saving Failed 
States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y  903 (1997). 
 60. See James Thuo Gathii, Geographical Hegelianism in Territorial Disputes Involv-
ing Non-European Land Relations: An Analysis of the Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu 
Island (Botswana/Namibia), in THE THIRD WORLD AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER: LAW, 
POLITICS AND GLOBALIZATION 75 (Antony Anghie et al., eds., 2003). 
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way when concerted action in the service of maintaining colonial domi-
nation was warranted. The first concrete step in this direction was con-
tainment of the “scramble for Africa” at the Berlin Conference on the 
Congo (1884-85), which aimed “to bring the natives of Africa within the 
pale of civilization by opening up the interior of the continent to com-
merce.”61 This Conference, from which Africans were completely ex-
cluded, institutionalized the “right” of “Great Powers” to colonial domi-
nion.62 It was determined that when faced with assertions of sovereignty 
over colonized territories, “it is only the recognition of such sovereignty 
by the members of the international society which concerns us, [of] that 
of uncivilised natives international law takes no account.”63 The logic of 
nineteenth century international law could not have had it any other way: 
International law has to treat such natives as uncivilised. It regulates, 
for the mutual benefit of the civilised states, the claims which they 
                                                                                                             
 61. German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, quoted in, Makau Wa Mutua, Critical 
Race Theory and International Law: The View of an Outsider, 45 VILL. L. REV. 841, 847 
(2000). 
 62. For pertinent parts of the text of the General Act of the Conference of Berlin, see 
ARCHIVES OF EMPIRE VOL. II: THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA 28–47 (Barbara Harlow & Mia 
Carter eds., 2003). As Bedjaoui says: “Classic international law . . . recognized and en-
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MOHAMMAD BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 49 (1979). 
For the Berlin West Africa Conference and its impact, see SCHMITT, supra note 31, at 
214–26; PROSSER GIFFORD & WM. ROGER LOUIS, FRANCE AND BRITAIN IN AFRICA: 
IMPERIAL RIVALRY AND COLONIAL RULE 167–220 (1971); THOMAS PAKENHAM, THE 
SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA 239–56 (1991); Charles Henry Alexanderowicz, The Role of 
Treaties in the European-African Confrontation in the Nineteenth Century, in AFRICAN 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL HISTORY 27–68 (A.K. Mensah-Brown ed., 1975). For the impact 
of the Berlin conference upon the pace of colonization of Africa, see maps of Africa circa 
1886, 1998, and 1921 in ARCHIVES OF EMPIRE, supra note 62, at 17–19. 
 63. JOHN WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 136 (1894) [hereinafter WESTLAKE, 
INTERNATIONAL]. It was agreed that: 
The power which henceforth take possession of a territory upon the coast of the 
African continent situated outside of its present possession, or which, not hav-
ing had such possessions hitherto, shall acquire them, and likewise, the Power 
which shall assume a protectorate there, shall accompany the respective act 
with a notification addressed to the other Signatory Powers of the present Act, 
in order to put them in a condition to make available, if there be occasion for it, 
their reclamations. 
General Act of the Conference of Berlin, art 34, Feb. 26, 1885, reprinted in 3 AM J. INT’L 
L. 7 (1909). 
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make to sovereignty over the region and leaves the treatment of the na-
tives to the conscience of the state to which sovereignty is awarded.64 
Consider that the Berlin Conference took place in the midst of Eu-
rope’s agrarian crisis and the Great Depression of 1873—86, which had 
“shaken confidence in economic self-healing” and gave colonial expan-
sion further impetus.65 This was also the time when a “specter of ‘over-
civilization’” was breeding “militarism” and a longing for “imperial ad-
venture” in the U.S.66 With the Great Powers’ right to colonize now se-
cure, collective military interventions to protect colonial orders were the 
next step in this progression. The coordinated military action in China by 
Western powers to put down the Boxer Uprising of 1900 was “the dra-
matic beginning of the contemporary phase of international history.”67 It 
was also in 1885, the year of the Berlin Conference, that British foreign 
policy and intelligence officials first developed blueprints for a “pan-
Islamic alliance [between] Egypt, Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan 
against czarist Russia.”68 This sowed a poison seed, the bitter fruits of 
which sour many a palate today. The Durand Line was drawn in this mi-
lieu. 
This global framework animated instrumental deployment of the law to 
reorder colonized spaces and bodies.69 Law in the colony aimed to “re-
                                                                                                             
 64. WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL, supra note 63, at 143 (1894). 
 65. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
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MODERNISM IN EGYPT 10 n.1 (1933). 
 69. See Sally Engle Merry, From Law and Colonialism to Law and Globalization, 28 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 569–71 (2003); NATHAN J. BROWN, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE ARAB 
WORLD: COURTS IN EGYPT AND THE GULF 5–18 (1997); CONTESTED STATES: LAW, 
HEGEMONY, AND RESISTANCE (Mindie Lazarus-Black & Susan F. Hirsch eds., 1994) (pre-
senting case studies on people use law to contest oppression); RONEN SHAMIR, THE 
COLONIES OF LAW: COLONIALISM, ZIONISM, AND LAW IN EARLY MANDATE PALESTINE 
(2000) (analyzing the ideologies and justice system that guided the development of Brit-
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duce them to civility,” those who had “no skill of submission.”70 Vi-
olence was deemed a vital instrument of colonial progress,71 with law 
furnishing “the cutting edge of colonialism.”72 Violence, in general, and 
the violence of law, in particular, played “the leading part in the creation 
of civilization.”73 Colonial rule deemed “[o]ur law . . . a compulsory 
gospel which admits of no dissent and no disobedience.”74 This overt 
concert of law and violence has been aptly characterized “lawfare[:] the 
effort to conquer and control indigenous peoples by the coercive use of 
legal means.”75 The geo-legal space of colonialism brings into sharp re-
lief “the blood that has dried on the codes of law.”76 
In the colony, law congealed epistemic, structural, and physical vi-
olence. The colonized other, deemed an error of arrested evolution, was 
prescribed corrective norms of a higher rational order. This “soul mak-
ing” 77 colonial project entailed entrenchment of a layered legal order. 
First, the colony was inserted into the global legal system of hierarchical-
ly differentiated sovereignties.78 Second, metropolitan law was trans-
planted in the colony supplemented by exceptions that ensured that coer-
cion displaced hegemony as its animating force,79 thereby ordering a 
“rule of difference” that mandated performance of nonidentity between 
the colonizer and the colonized.80 Third, through selective recognition, 
malleable norms of the colonized were truncated and reconstituted as 
                                                                                                             
 70. JAMES AXTELL, THE INVASION WITHIN: THE CONTEST OF CULTURES IN COLONIAL 
NORTH AMERICA 131, 271 (1985) (citation omitted). 
 71. See ASHIS NANDY, THE INTIMATE ENEMY: LOSS AND RECOVERY OF SELF UNDER 
COLONIALISM 69 (1983). 
 72. MARTIN CHANOCK, LAW, CUSTOM, AND SOCIAL ORDER: THE COLONIAL 
EXPERIENCE IN MALAWI AND ZAMBIA 4 (1985). 
 73. ERIC STOKES, THE ENGLISH UTILITARIANS AND INDIA 289, 294 (1959) [hereinafter 
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 74. James Fitzjames Stephens, quoted in, R. C. J. COCKS, SIR HENRY MAINE: A STUDY 
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289 (1993). 
 77. Benita Parry, Current Theories of Colonial Discourse, in THE POST-COLONIAL 
STUDIES READER, 39 (Bill Ashcroft et. al. eds., 1995). See also OLÚFÚMI TÁÍWÒ, HOW 
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stitutional legacy of colonialism). 
 78. See supra notes 49–59 and accompanying text. 
 79. See generally RANAJIT GUHA, DOMINANCE WITHOUT HEGEMONY: HISTORY AND 
POWER IN COLONIAL INDIA (1997) (exploring the consequences of the social-political 
structure born out of British control). 
 80. See PARTHA CHATTERJEE, THE NATION AND ITS FRAGMENTS 16–24 (1993). 
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fixed “customary law.”81 In the career of the Durand Line all these legal 
machinations of the colonial project came into play. 
B. Modern Geography and the Colonial Encounter 
Examination of the role of geography within the matrix of modern re-
gimes of knowledge production in general, and of colonialism in particu-
lar, is sorely needed. Modern social theory, while privileging time, has 
tended to treat space as “dead, the fixed, the undialectical, the immo-
bile.”82 The point of departure of this article, however, is that the spatial 
and the temporal are mutually constitutive, “in that each shapes and is 
simultaneously shaped by the other in a complex interrelationship which 
may vary in different social formations and at different historical con-
junctures.”83 Edward Said spoke of “imaginative geograph[ies]” that fold 
distance into difference by multiplying partitions and enclosures that 
serve to demarcate “the same” from the “other” and by “designating in 
one’s mind a familiar space which is ‘ours’ and an unfamiliar space 
beyond ‘ours’ which is ‘theirs.’”84 Besides, “geography legitimates, 
excuses, rationalizes, in its very act of origination.”85 
Modern geography is “amongst the advance-guard of a wider ‘western’ 
epistemology, deeply implicated in colonial-imperial power.”86 Not sur-
prisingly, “geography is inescapably marked (both philosophically and 
institutionally) by its location and development as a western-colonial 
science.”87 From its very inception, modern geography formed part of the 
knowledge production and application attendant to colonialism that 
aimed to get a grasp on colonized territories and bodies by deploying an 
                                                                                                             
 81. See FRANCIS G. SNYDER, CAPITALISM AND LEGAL CHANGE: AN AFRICAN 
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impulse to chart, count, and map.88 The “discovery” of new lands was 
seen as enabling a “true and perfect geography.”89 As a critical compo-
nent of the Enlightenment’s project of knowledge production, geography 
helped constitute the “other” against which modernity itself was interpo-
lated.90 Geography adopted the confident regime of reason that “there 
can be nothing so remote that we cannot reach to it, nor so recondite that 
we cannot discover it.”91 Geography was in the vanguard of this enter-
prise to reach, discover, and grasp, and it underwrote Europe’s “planeta-
ry consciousness.”92 Of course, what was “discovered” was unavoidably 
constituted by the “discovery,” such that “[g]eography was not merely 
engaged in discovering the world; it was making it.”93 Given the spatial 
imperatives of an empire, modern geography developed “to serve the 
interests of imperialism in its various aspects including territorial acqui-
sition, economic exploitation, militarism and the practice of class and 
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race domination.”94 Geographers were “among the front ranks of explor-
ers, surveyors, technologists, and ideologues of empire”95 and often “the 
most vociferous imperialists.”96 
Geography played a critical role in colonial technologies of gover-
nance that produced territorially coherent units such as “India.”97 Colo-
nizers were “anxious to inaugurate some system for . . . correcting and 
revising received geography of [the newly created colony].”98 To govern 
a territory, one must know it. Because, supposedly, “a single shelf of a 
good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and 
Arabia,”99 the colonists tried “to graft the science of the West on to an 
Eastern stem.”100 They settled upon “a technological solution—
”triangulation”—which promised to perfect geographical knowledge.”101 
The survey of Bengal, initiated in 1763, and the resulting Bengal Atlas 
(1779) and the Map of Hindoostan (1782), were deemed works of “the 
first importance both for strategic and administrative purposes.”102 Theo-
retical debates of geographers and geologists of Britain and continental 
Europe during the nineteenth century drew extensively on this work.103 
The Great Trigonometrical Survey of India (1878), guided by the 
“flawed . . . certainty and correctness granted by the Enlightenment’s 
epistemology” finally helped colonizers produce “their India.”104 This 
process furnished the grounds for the colonial production of India, which 
had “hardly ever been a single, integrated political entity,”105 as a 
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bounded political unit and substantiated that “an imagined epistemology 
could intervene to shape the political definition of actual territory.”106 
The late nineteenth century is by most accounts a unique moment in 
the history of modern geography. As colonialism spread across the globe, 
the incipient discipline of modern geography had to contend with coloni-
al expansion and imperial ambitions.107 This is when geography shifted 
its conceptual grounds from naturalistic theology to evolutionary biolo-
gy, and geographers became part of the “stratum of organic intellectuals 
of empire.”108 Darwin’s theory of evolution through natural selection, 
Spencer’s theory of environmental determination, and Lamarck’s theory 
of inheritance left formative imprints on the discipline.109 As a result, 
modern geography played a critical role in the modern constructions of 
race that enabled and sustained colonial domination.110 These construc-
tions of racial difference and hierarchy helped reconcile colonial domina-
tion with liberal ideals of liberty and equality.111 Most important for this 
article, modern geography produced classifications of bodies and spaces 
that enabled colonial powers to draw “lines on a map which had little 
relation to underlying cultural or economic patterns. . . . These designa-
tions continue to haunt these regions to this day.”112 Also relevant to this 
story is the proclivity of European colonizers to “categoriz[e] mountain 
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and hill regions as distinctive political and cultural spaces . . . [and to] 
portray[] . . . highlanders as belligerents . . . [and] hill regions as tending 
towards violence.”113 Modern geography facilitated such an image and 
colonial designs were devised to subdue and control mountain and hill 
regions. 
C. Geopolitics and Imperial Designs 
The late nineteenth century also saw the rise of the discipline of geopo-
litics—knowledge claims about the relationship between space and pow-
er, and particularly about the impact of geography on the conduct of for-
eign policy. A geopolitical vision is “any idea concerning the relation 
between one’s own and other places, involving feelings of (in)security or 
(dis)advantage (and/or) invoking ideas about a collective mission or for-
eign policy . . . . [which] requires at least a Them-and-Us distinction.”114 
From its birth, this discipline bore the marks of the temporal and spatial 
context of its emergence, i.e., the age of empire and “race sciences.”115 
The discipline’s professed claims to objectivity and neutrality notwith-
standing, geopolitics “was always a highly ideological and deeply politi-
cized form of analysis”116 that furnished “pseudo-scientific justifications 
for colonial expansionism . . . .”117 Incipient geopolitics sutured colonial-
ism with theories of biological and social evolution to predict the decline 
                                                                                                             
 113. BENTON, supra note 34, at 224–25. 
 114. GERTJAN DIJKINK, NATIONAL IDENTITY & GEOPOLITICAL VISION: MAPS OF PRIDE 
& PAIN 11 (1996) (emphasis added). 
 115. See John S. Dryzek & David Schlosberg, Disciplining Darwin: Biology in the 
History of Political Science, in POLITICAL SCIENCE IN HISTORY: RESEARCH PROGRAMS 
AND POLITICAL TRADITIONS 123 (James Farr et al. eds., 1995). Halford Mackinder, a pio-
neer of geo-politics, theorized that natural regions have differentiated flows of sap and 
blood running through their populations giving them different characteristics of physique 
and character. Halford John Mackinder, The Human Habitat, 47 SCOT. GEOGRAPHICAL 
MAG. 321, 324–28, 331–35 (1931). Ellen Semple theorized how the sturdy energy of the 
Anglo-Saxon race was reinvigorated by settlement of North America and formulated 
“scientific” justifications for the ideology of manifest destiny. ELLEN CHURCHILL SEMPLE, 
AMERICAN HISTORY AND ITS GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS (1903). See also THOMAS R. 
HIETALA, MANIFEST DESTINY: AMERICAN  EXCEPTIONALISM AND EMPIRE 261–62 (rev. ed. 
2003). 
 116. Gearóid Ó. Tuathail & John Agnew, Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geo-
political Reasoning in American Foreign Policy, in EXPLORING HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 361 
(Stephen Daniels & Roger Lee eds., 1996). 
 117. Sanjay Chaturvedi, Can There be an Asian Geopolitics?, in SPACE, TERRITORY 
AND THE STATE: NEW READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 1, 5 (Ranabir Samaddar ed., 
2002). See also, Halford J. Mackinder, The Teaching of Geography from an Imperial 
Point of View, 6 GEOGRAPHICAL TCHR. 79 (1911). 
22 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 36:1 
and even the demise of “inferior” races.118 In 1899, a military surveyor 
and future President of the Royal Geographical society made an evoca-
tive statement: 
Truly, this period in our history has been well defined as the boundary-
making era . . . such an endless vista of political geography arises be-
fore us . . . such a vision of great burdens for the white man to take up 
in far-off regions, dim and indefinite as yet.119 
The founding canon of geopolitics is directly relevant to the story of 
the Durand Line. Halford John Mackinder’s “Heartland” thesis foresaw a 
reassertion of Central Asia as swinging the global balance of power to 
the Asian heartland, which could become the base of a global empire. 120 
Alfred Mahan saw the territorial arc running from Turkey to China as a 
geopolitical “no man’s land,” one ‘“destined’ to be a disputed area be-
tween Russia and maritime powers.”121 Nicholas John Spykman gathered 
these conceptual threads to weave the “Rimland” thesis which posits that 
the real power potential of Eurasia lay not in its heartland but in its litto-
ral rim which was thickly populated, rich with resources, and strategical-
ly located.122 Consequently, “[w]ho controls the rimland rules Eurasia; 
who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world.”123 Mackinder had 
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a specific recipe particularly relevant to the Durand Line: “In all the Brit-
ish Empire there is but one land frontier on which war-like preparation 
must ever be ready. It is the north-west frontier of India.”124 Later geopo-
litical enunciations about the region remain little more than worked-up 
permutations of the Makinder-Mahan-Spykman combine.125 
D. Frontiers, Boundaries, and Borders 
Borders are human constructs built through an amalgamation of geo-
graphy, cartography, theories of sovereignty, and prevailing constella-
tions of power. In the process of being drawn “maps make reality as 
much as they represent it.”126 Any examination of borders often con-
fronts an official politics of forgetting, an elaborate attempt to obliterate 
the contested origins and nature of the border.127 Borders take different 
forms in different historical and political circumstances. Usually traced 
back to the Roman Empire that marked out discrete territories to distin-
guish centers of population density and uninhabited surroundings, the 
history of borders and frontiers is ancient and varied.128 Romans ex-
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tended this practice to Gaul and Britain. In the Middle Ages, newly dis-
covered long-distance trade routes were loosely divided into zones as 
clear assertions of political control to allocate responsibility for protec-
tion of trade caravans and the right to levy transit charges. Consolidation 
of centralized monarchies in Europe in the twelfth and thirteenth centu-
ries ushered in the phase of defined political borders. The Renaissance 
made cartography popular; maps became an instrument of centralizing 
control.129 With colonialism, maps became a weapon of statecraft when 
imperial powers used topographical features on maps as bargaining chips 
among themselves. Boundaries were drawn to manipulate distribution of 
power among colonial powers, thereby creating a direct connection be-
tween colonialism and borders later inherited by postcolonial states. In 
this progression, a European practice of demarcated borders was imposed 
upon, and subsequently internalized by, postcolonial formations. 
Borders just as often join what is different as divide what is similar.130 
Here, it is important to distinguish frontiers from boundaries.131 A boun-
dary denotes a line while a frontier is a zone. In effect, a boundary girds 
a frontier. Frontiers— zones at the periphery of political orders—have 
over the last few centuries been replaced by defined lines of political 
control, the borders of the state.132 The idea of the frontier had a particu-
lar purchase in the colonial imagination. Discourses of “discovery,” “ter-
ra nullius,” and the “frontier” commingled to furnish license to occupy 
and subjugate coveted spaces that were represented as being “empty.”133 
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Indeed, for colonial settler-states, territorial expansion into and settle-
ment of “empty” areas furnished the constitutive grounds of their identi-
ty.134 
During the phase of decolonization, borders became a crucial issue for 
postcolonial states. In most cases, the inherited borders were in large 
measure determined by geopolitical, economic, and administrative poli-
cies of colonial powers that had occupied these territories. Colonial 
claims were often carved up with little regard to the coherence of histor-
ic, cultural, and ethnic zones. As a result, historical and cultural units 
were split, and different cultures, religions, languages, identities, and 
affiliations were enclosed in demarcated territorial units. The connection 
between a people and their territory, assumed and prescribed by Euro-
centric theories of the “nation-state,” found no room in these configura-
tions. These inherited colonial demarcations, reinforced by postcolonial 
states, often provoke challenge and resistance from below by assertions 
of identity and difference. Power-blocs of postcolonial formations, in an 
effort to legitimize their new-found hegemony, impose a firm control 
over the inherited borders to draw “sharper lines between citizens, in-
vested with certain rights and duties, and ‘aliens’ or ‘foreigners.’”135 The 
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result is territorial disputes with adjacent polities and/or suppression of 
difference within, two intractable issues that quickly become the primary 
preoccupations of the postcolonial states. The career of the Durand Line 
is an evocative story of these intractable conflicts and the inability of 
existing legal regimes to resolve them. 
III. IMPERIAL GREAT GAMES AND DRAWING OF LINES 
What the map cuts up, the story cuts across.136 
A. Great Game I: The Genesis of the “Buffer to a Buffer” 
The Durand Line emerged as an instrumentality in the so-called Great 
Game,137 the contest between British colonial expansion in India and 
eastward colonial expansion of Czarist Russia, one that turned the inter-
mediate region into “a cockpit of international rivalry.”138 During the 
nineteenth century, issues of frontiers, boundaries, and borders within the 
Persian Plateau as a geographical unit were contentious.139 Imperial ef-
forts to fix boundaries of control that conflicted with the practices and 
experience of native populations for whom frontiers were essentially 
mobile and porous, compounded these contentions. This mobility and 
porosity stemmed from the region’s location at the junction of historic 
trade routes between China, India, Central Asia, Persia, and the Arab 
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world. 140 The Great Game was a contest, both overt and shadowy, over 
territory where different imperial orders came into volatile proximity. 
The conflicts turned on questions of territory, zones of influence, and 
spatial buffers. 
The British were unequivocal about their empire’s need to have “scien-
tific frontiers” that had to be demarcated under “European pressure and 
by the intervention of European agents.”141 Lord Curzon, the arch-
imperialist and Viceroy of India, proposed a specific recipe for colonial 
India—a “threefold Frontier.”142 British imperial strategists were mindful 
of the simultaneous expansion of British and Russian empires in the 
heartland of Asia. A “frontier of separation” rather than a “frontier of 
contact” was to be the solution which led to the creation of protectorates, 
neutral zones, and buffers in between.143 This policy of a “three-fold 
frontier” was choreographed and implemented in the northwest of co-
lonial India. The first frontier, at the edge of directly controlled territory, 
enabled the colonial regime to exercise full authority and impose its legal 
and political order. The second frontier, just beyond the first, was a zone 
of indirect rule where colonial domination proceeded through existing 
institutions of social control. The third frontier was a string of buffer 
states which, while maintaining formal political autonomy and trappings 
of statehood, aligned foreign relations with the interests of the British. 
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 Fig. 2: Contemplated Northwest Frontier of Colonial India144 
 1- River Oxus 
 2- Hindu Kush 
3- Current Frontier, Suliman Mountains 
4- Suliman Mountain Foothills (Selected Territories) 
5- Indus River 
The story of the Durand Line shows that colonial map-making simul-
taneously exhibits “both delusions of grandeur and delusions of engulf-
ment.”145 Historically, the river Indus was seen as the western boundary 
of India.146 The region west of the Indus and south of the Oxus river, was 
home to the dominant ethnic group of the region, the Pashtun, who have 
a recorded history going well before 500 B.C.147 Located at the southern 
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edge of Central Asia and flanking the Chinese, Persian, and Indian em-
pires, the Pashtun saw different phases of unity and fragmentation, along 
with Hindu, Buddhist, and Muslim cultural influences. Regional geopo-
litical maneuverings shaped the formation of the modern state of Afgha-
nistan out of shards of rival tribal fiefdoms, ethnic loyalties, and shifting 
alliances and allegiances.148 In 1747, as the Mughal and Persian empires 
were imploding, Ahmad Khan Durrani, a Pashtun military commander, 
took control of the region and created an Afghan tribal confederacy dom-
inated by the Pashtuns, as a distinct political entity in the region—giving 
birth to what came to be called Afghanistan.149 Given the circumstances 
of its emergence, Lord Curzon was to call the state “purely acciden-
tal.”150 The Durrani dynasty came to an end only in 1974, when Afgha-
nistan became a republic. 
Just as Afghanistan was emerging as a unified political entity, the Brit-
ish East India Company established political control over the fertile delta 
                                                                                                             
complex and marked by feuds, alliances, and compromises. Among these fault lines is the 
300-year-old conflict between the Ghilzai and Durrani tribes; one that animates the strug-
gle between the Taliban and the Karzai government in Afghanistan. Thomas H. Johnson 
& M. Chris Mason, Understanding the Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 51 ORBIS 71–
89 (2007) [hereinafter Johnson & Mason, Understanding]. A Pathan’s identity is consti-
tuted through concentric rings consisting of family, extended family, clan, tribe, confede-
racy, and linguistic group. The hierarchy of personal loyalties tracks these circles and 
become accentuated as the circle gets smaller. This segmentation and locus of loyalties 
are the primary reasons that no foreign entity—whether Alexander, the British, the Pakis-
tanis, the Soviets, or the Americans—has been able to reconcile the Pathans to external 
rule. As British colonial rule in India moved westward from Bengal, the East India Com-
pany officials began to probe the region in the late eighteenth century. There followed 
generations of explorers, administrators, and soldiers who remained unable to penetrate 
and subdue it. This gave rise to the weaving of a complex mythology around the Pathans, 
portraying them as warlike, brave, savage, and stoic. One elderly Pashtun tribesman told 
a visiting British official in 1809: “We are content with discord, we are content with 
alarms, we are content with blood . . . [but] we will never be content with a master.” 
Quoted in, STEPHEN TANNER, AFGHANISTAN: A MILITARY HISTORY FROM ALEXANDER THE 
GREAT TO THE FALL OF THE TALIBAN 134 (2002). The Pashtuns “accept no law but their 
own.” JAMES W. SPAIN, THE PATHAN BORDERLAND 68 (1963) [hereinafter SPAIN, 
BORDERLAND]. The absence of modern structures of governance should not be conflated 
with the absence of governance. Complex and sophisticated dispute-resolution mechan-
isms, legal codes, and alternative systems of social control have developed in the region 
over a millennia. Pashtunwali (the way of the Pastun) is the keystone of Pashtun identity, 
social structure, and behavior. Many stereotypes of the Pashtun flourished during colo-
nialism. See, e.g., Paul Titus, Honor the Baloch, Buy the Pushtun: Stereotypes, Social 
Organization and History in Western Pakistan, 32 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 657 (1998). 
 148. See KARL E. MEYER & SHAREEN BLAIR BRYSAC, TOURNAMENT OF SHADOWS: THE 
GREAT GAME AND THE RACE FOR EMPIRE IN CENTRAL ASIA 65 (1999). 
 149. CHAPMAN, supra note 139, at 90–91. 
 150. Curzon, quoted in, GREGORY, COLONIAL PRESENT, supra note 21, at 31. 
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of Bengal in 1757, and began the process of colonizing India.151 Over the 
next century, British colonial rule in India expanded westward. At the 
time, Russia’s sense of its eastern border was “vague and protean, shaped 
by the constellation of power on its frontiers at any given moment.”152 
Imperial Russia started to expand southwards and eastwards through the 
Caucasus, just when British colonial rule was expanding westward and 
northward in India.153 Unavoidably, Central Asia, the zone of confluence 
of two expanding imperial empires, became the terrain of the Great 
Game. As the frontlines of two empires approached each other, the Great 
Game intensified. 154 To check Russia’s growing presence in Central 
Asia in the early nineteenth century, the British aimed to turn Afghanis-
tan into a “buffer state” governed by a compliant ruler. The “three fold 
frontier,” that Curzon was later to articulate,155 came into play. 
An internal struggle for the throne of Kabul in the 1830’s gave the 
British their first opening to play kingmakers in Afghanistan. In June 
1838, the British signed a secret agreement with Ranjit Singh, the Sikh 
ruler of Punjab, and Shah Shujah, a claimant to the Kabul throne. 156 In 
return for their help in putting him in power, Shujah renounced Afghan 
claims to Kashmir and substantial areas between the Indus river and the 
Khyber Pass in favor of Ranjit Singh and agreed to become an ally of the 
British in their struggle with Russia. This agreement triggered what 
mainstream history styles the First Afghan War, when a 21,000-strong 
British “Army of the Indus” invaded Afghanistan in 1839 and installed 
Shujah as the Amir.157 The license to colonize and dominate granted by 
contemporaneous international law to the “Great Powers” of the day 
                                                                                                             
 151. For the chronology and pattern of spatial expansion of British colonial rule in 
India, see CHAPMAN, supra note 139, at fig. 4.1, fig. 4.2. 
 152. GEOFFREY HOSKING, RUSSIA, PEOPLE AND EMPIRE 1552–1917, at 14 (1998). See 
also Alfred J. Reiber, Persistent Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, in IMPERIAL RUSSIAN 
FOREIGN POLICY 315, 329–30 (Hugh Ragsdale ed., 1993); RUSSIAN COLONIAL EXPANSION 
TO 1917 (Michael Rwykin ed., 1988) (providing some perspective on the preservation of 
Russia’s territorial conquests). 
 153. By the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828, Russia forced Persia to cede Transcauca-
sia, thus eliminating a barrier to Russian expansion into Turkistan. CAROE, supra note 
147, at 317. See also DEMETRIUS CHARLES BOULGER, II ENGLAND AND RUSSIA IN 
CENTRAL ASIA 338–39, 382–93 (1879). 
 154. For a detailed account, see MEYER & BRYSAC, supra note 148, at 111–36. 
 155. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 156. See HOPKIRK, supra note 137, at 188–201; CAROE, supra note 147, at 319–21. 
 157. See J. A. NORRIS, THE FIRST AFGHAN WAR 1838–1842, at 231–302 (1967). To 
facilitate the march of the invading army through the historic Bolan Pass in Baluchistan, 
the British set in place a process that later incorporated Punjab, Sind, and Baluchistan 
into colonial India. See VINCENT A. SMITH, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF INDIA 599–619 (3d 
ed. Percival Spear ed., 1958). 
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proved useful. However, the initial British success proved short-lived—
resistance against the occupation force and their puppet leader broke out, 
and in 1842 the deposed Amir, Dost Mohammad Kahn, was returned to 
power, and the British invasion force was decimated.158 
During the subsequent twenty years, the British started to bring the re-
gion west of the Indus river under colonial rule. Occupation of the Pun-
jab in 1849, until then an independent state, brought under British control 
traditionally Afghan areas up to the eastern end of the legendary Khyber 
Pass that Punjab had annexed before the First Afghan War.159 In 1857, 
India erupted in an anti-colonial revolt ignited by a mutiny of the Bengal 
Army. The revolt proved to be a watershed moment in the history of co-
lonial rule, and led to a reordering of the Punjab as the “sword arm of the 
Raj.”160 British forces finally suppressed the revolt, and the governance 
of colonial India passed from the East India Company to the Crown, but 
“British fears of rebellion, conspiracies, holy wars, and possible foreign 
provocation” heightened.161 Through innovative colonial legal regimes, a 
“military-fiscal state” was turned into a “military state,” the Bengal Ar-
my was disbanded, and a reconstituted Punjab began to serve as “the mil-
itary bulwark of the Raj.”162 The British deployed a racist recruiting doc-
trine known as the “martial race theory,” to raise a new “Indian Army,” 
with over half of it recruited from the Punjab, to serve as the “Empire’s 
‘fire brigade.’”163 This army was to be “the iron fist in the velvet glove of 
                                                                                                             
 158. HOPKIRK, supra note 137, at 236–77. 
 159. Upon incorporation into colonial India, the Punjab was declared a “non-
regulation” province, combining executive, legislative, and judicial functions, in a form 
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READER 1–2 (Pramod K. Nayar ed., 2007). 
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ENGLISH UTILITARIANS, supra note 73, at 243. 
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without paying for them.’” Quoted in, B. R. Tomlinson, India and the British Empire, 
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Victorian expansionism . . . the major coercive force behind the interna-
tionalization of industrial capitalism.”164 
As the pace of Russian eastward expansion picked up after the Cri-
mean War (1854-56), the British “became obsessed with the Great 
Game,” and the Punjab as “the garrison province of the Raj . . . [was] 
reoriented . . . to meet[] the challenge of an external danger.”165 The rap-
id transformation of the Punjab into a “garrison state” involved novel 
colonial legal orders of land tenure, revenue extraction, military recruit-
ment, resettlement of indigenous communities, rural social control, and 
political governance.166 Colonial social engineering included refashion-
ing of religious affiliations, identities, and practices.167 To orchestrate 
this enterprise, a suitable administrative system was fashioned for the 
Punjab that “in both form and spirit . . . had a strong military flavor.”168 
A century later, this reconstruction of the Punjab became the grounds for 
“Punjabisation of the state”169 of Pakistan, its praetorian tenor, and the 
source of its “post-independence propensity towards a military-
dominated state.”170 
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British occupation and reordering of the Punjab in the middle of the 
nineteenth century produced the northwest border problem in the territo-
ries to the west of the river Indus that remains a source of conflict to this 
day. The northwest edge of this region, a great belt of mountains stret-
ching over 1200 miles from Pamir to Persia, was home of scores of Pash-
tun tribes that had a long history of effective armed resistance against 
encroachers and of retaining their autonomy from the political orders 
around them.171 Fierce resistance by these tribes started as soon as co-
lonial rule came to their vicinity.172 It was then that the British policy of 
creating a frontier zone between Afghanistan and colonial directly-
administered areas came into force.173 This so-called “close border” poli-
cy, also known as “masterly inactivity,” provided that no further west-
ward expansion of direct colonial rule was possible or warranted, and 
therefore British sovereignty should not be extended to areas and tribes 
that could not be subdued and governed effectively.174 First implemented 
in Baluchistan and later further north,175 the close border policy created a 
peculiar frontier zone—a narrow stretch of territory inhabited by Pashtun 
tribes maintaining their modes of self-governance, dotted with colonial 
military outposts, absent direct colonial administration, but discouraged 
from maintaining their traditional political relations with Afghanistan. 
Foothills at the edge of directly-administered “settled” areas were forti-
fied to keep out the tribes, who, in exchange for monetary subsidies, 
were to keep access to military outposts open, and, in contravention to 
their tribal code, were to deny sanctuary to fugitives from the settled 
areas.176 The system did not work well. The Pashtun tribes of the frontier 
zone remained restive, resulting in twenty-three British military opera-
tions between 1857 and 1881 to subdue them.177 
A new British policy, initiated by the Disraeli government to build a 
new strategic line of defense against Russian pressure in Central Asia, 
led in 1876 to the abandonment of the “close border” policy in favor of 
the so-called “forward policy.” 178 The new policy called for aggressive 
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 172. See H. T. LAMBRICK, SIR CHARLES NAPIER AND SIND 275–98 (1952). 
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 174. See CAROE, supra note 147, at 346–59. 
 175. See id. at 370–73. 
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 177. See CAROE, supra note 147, at 348. For a table of record of “pacification” expedi-
tions against the frontier tribes, see CHAPMAN, supra note 139, at 104–07. 
 178. See CAROE, supra note 147, at 370–89; HOPKIRK, supra note 137, at 359–64. The 
“forward policy” aimed at “pushing the international boundary as far westward and 
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expansion into and control over the frontier regions. Strong points in the 
tribal belt were to be captured, fortified, garrisoned, and connected with 
protected roads. This “forward policy,” in its extreme, envisaged pushing 
the boundary as far west as the Hindu Kush mountain range in the mid-
dle of Afghanistan, with the Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar arc forming the 
first line of defense for colonial India.179 As the new policy unfolded, 
British meddling in Afghan and Persian affairs increased.180 Decisions of 
a British Commission demarcating the disputed border between Afgha-
nistan and Persia and permanent stationing of British garrisons nearby, 
heightened Afghan concerns about hostile encirclement. 181 The Afghans 
made overtures towards the Russians to counter-balance the growing 
British influence.182 The result was the Second Afghan War, when, in 
November 1878, the British launched a three-pronged attack on Afghan 
territory.183 The Amir abdicated in favor of his son.184 The son then 
ceded control over the Khyber Pass and agreed to become a vassal of the 
British, who were to control the external relations of his country.185 After 
some pacification campaigns around the country, the British troops with-
drew from Afghanistan in 1880.186 One result of the Second Afghan War 
was the institution of a joint Russo-British commission to determine the 
border between Russia and Afghanistan, with the latter to serve as a buf-
fer between the two imperial empires.187 
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Confronted with increasing demands for more concessions by the co-
lonial government of India, in 1892, the Afghan Amir sought to visit 
Britain to negotiate directly with the British government.188 The algebra 
of differentiated sovereignties came into play—British authorities re-
fused his request, forcing him to negotiate with British colonial authori-
ties in India.189 The Amir yielded to British pressure to delineate Afgha-
nistan’s eastern boundary.190 The British proceeded to “dictate a boun-
dary settlement,”191 signed by the Amir and Henry Mortimer Durand, 
foreign secretary of British India, on 12 November 1893.192 This agree-
ment adjusted the “the eastern and southern frontier of His Highness’s 
[the Amir’s] dominions, from Wakhan to the Persian border.” 193 The 
result was the Durand Line, which pushed colonial India’s border with 
Afghanistan from the eastern foot of the frontier hills to their crest.194 
Curzon’s dream of “scientific frontiers” demarcated under “European 
pressure and by the intervention of European agents,” appeared to be 
coming true.195 
The Durand Line proved more difficult to delineate on the ground than 
to draw on paper.196 Initially surveyed in 1894-5, most of the demarca-
tion was completed by 1896, though the section around the Khyber Pass 
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was only demarcated after the Third Afghan War in 1921.197 While some 
inaccessible sections remained unmarked, the line created a strategic 
frontier that “did not correspond to any ethnic or historical boundary.”198 
Slicing through tribes, villages, and clans, it “cut the Pukhtoon people in 
two.”199 The Pashtun tribes resisted attempts at demarcation, including, 
in some cases, burning down camps of the Boundary Commission. The 
British response was to station substantial permanent garrisons.200 The 
Pashtuns remained restive, with religious leaders often playing leading 
roles in the insurgencies. 201 
In tune with the colonial project of reordering colonized bodies and 
spaces, in 1901, British authorities severed the “settled areas” of the 
northwest region under British control from the Punjab to form an evoca-
tively named North-West Frontier Province (“NWFP”), though with a 
status not on par with other provinces. 202 Control over the tribal belt be-
tween the “settled areas” of NWFP and the Durand Line remained with 
the central government. The belt, now designated Federally Adminis-
tered Tribal Area (“FATA”), was to serve as a “buffer to a buffer.”203 
The legal order of colonial India did not extend to this zone and the tribes 
on the grounds that “[r]igour is inseparable from the government of such 
a people. We cannot rein wild horses with silken braids.”204 Tribes were 
to conduct their internal affairs under their customary norms. However, 
to supervise matters that touched the security interests of the British, a 
unique set of rules and procedures, draconian even by colonial standards, 
were enforced under the Frontier Crimes Regulation.205 This created yet 
another “anomalous legal zones”206 like others that came into existence 
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in many European colonies. In the case of FATA, Pashtun tribes, 
“though not [] fully-fledged British subject[s] in the legal sense of the 
term, lived within the territorial boundaries of India.”207 To facilitate 
such territorial arrangements within British colonies, the Parliament had 
established a process for outlying districts intended “to remove those 
districts from beyond the pale of the law.”208 Tribes on both sides of the 
Durand Line continued to disregard it, and incessant tribal resistance 
prompted successive punitive expeditions. Even the semblance of order 
broke down with the Third Afghan War of 1919, when Afghanistan de-
clared war, an effort joined by FATA tribes and Pashtun troops who de-
serted the colonial forces.209 This short war resulted in Afghanistan re-
gaining control over its foreign affairs.210 However, the FATA tribes re-
mained restive, and colonial efforts to quell incessant revolts included 
the first use of aerial bombardment in the history of India, laying waste 
to the country where local tribes had supported the invasion.211 The tribes 
maintained their traditional connections with Afghanistan while negotiat-
ing the new FATA dispensation. 
When the Indian struggle for decolonization gained momentum in the 
early 20th century, Pashtuns of “settled areas” quickly gravitated towards 
the movement.212 The struggle forced the British to take initial steps to-
wards allowing natives to participate in political governance in 1920 un-
der the Montagu-Chelmsford “reforms,” which envisaged an “advance 
towards self-government in stages.”213 The NWFP and FATA, however, 
were left out of the scheme on the grounds that, as the chief colonial ad-
ministrator of the region put it, the Pashtuns “w[ere] not ready for . . . 
‘responsible government.’”214 In response, Pashtuns gave their anti-
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colonial movement an organized form aimed at braiding “factors of his-
tory, geography, culture, and language to transform the relatively back-
ward, divided, and disorganized Pukhtuns into a national community.”215 
This movement, which came to be known as Surkhposh (Red-shirts), 
expressly adopted non-violence as a foundational principle of social and 
political action and became politically allied with the Indian National 
Congress, the spearhead of India’s independence movement.216 
When India’s anti-colonial struggle escalated into a civil-disobedience 
movement in the early 1930s, it had “only a marginal effect on the Pun-
jab” thanks to the entrenched administrative, political, and social order in 
that “garrison province.”217 NWFP, on the other hand, proved receptive 
to the call, and in 1930 colonial authorities declared martial law in order 
to quell the civil-disobedience movement and to prevent armed tribes of 
FATA from making common cause with residents of the settled areas.218 
In 1935, the British enacted the Government of India Act in response to 
the ascending independence movement in India.219 This Act provided for 
increased political participation through an enlarged franchise to elect 
provincial legislative assemblies with broadened powers.220 When the 
first-ever elections took place in NWFP in 1937, the Indian National 
Congress, the secular nationalist party, won handily and formed the pro-
vincial government.221 Because the 1935 Act was applicable only to 
provinces, FATA, the “buffer to a buffer,” remained outside the ambit of 
constitutional reforms and the right to vote and representation.222 The 
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result was a spike in armed resistance in FATA, triggering more cam-
paigns of “‘pacification’ by British and Indian troops.”223 
In 1947, “the tectonic plates of South Asian politics shifted abrupt-
ly.”224 The British partitioned colonial India into two independent 
states—India and Pakistan—surgically dividing “Hindi majority” areas 
from “Muslim majority” ones, substantiating once again the wonderful 
artificiality of states,225 and triggering “one of the great human convul-
sions of history.”226 That Pashtuns, while overwhelmingly Muslim, had 
consistently voted for the secular Indian National Congress and helped it 
form the provincial government in NWFP, struck the colonial Viceroy’s 
office, which presided over the religion-based partition, as “a bastard 
situation.”227 To bring NWFP in line with the designed partition, the co-
lonial authorities bypassed the generally prescribed process of allowing 
elected representatives of provinces in their respective legislative assem-
blies to determine the future of the province. A referendum to choose 
between India and Pakistan was offered instead.228 Most Pashtuns, in-
cluding both the “Red Shirts” and the governing political party of the 
province, boycotted the referendum in protest against NWFP having 
been made an exception to the prescribed process, and because the subs-
titute process of referendum did not offer a third option, namely, separate 
independent statehood.229 This demand for a separate state for the Pash-
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tuns, styled Pashtunistan, emerged as the partition of India became in-
evitable.230 In the end, NWFP was awarded to Pakistan following a con-
troversial referendum.231 For FATA tribes, yet another mode to deter-
mine their fate was devised. In special tribal jirgas (tribal assemblies) 
orchestrated by the colonial administrators, hand-picked leaders of the 
FATA tribes were asked to signify their allegiance to Pakistan and re-
ceived the assurance that monetary allowances and autonomous status of 
the tribes would continue undisturbed.232 
Decolonization and the partition of India drew into sharp relief the 
contested status of the Durand Line, which now became a disputed mat-
ter between Afghanistan and Pakistan.233 As soon as India was parti-
tioned, Afghanistan renewed claims to the area between the Durand Line 
and the Indus.234 In 1947, Afghanistan joined the demand for Pashtunis-
tan, opposed Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations, and later condi-
tioned its recognition upon granting the right of self determination to the 
people of NWFP and FATA, who were caught in between.235 “In 1949, 
an Afghan loya jirga [(grand tribal assembly) formally] declared the Du-
rand Line invalid.”236 Thus, Pakistan started its postcolonial career as 
successor to a territorial dispute and with an ambivalent relationship with 
a section of the population located within its designated territorial 
bounds. 
B. Great Game II: The Cold War and the Frontline State 
The partition of India and inclusion of NWFP and FATA in Pakistan 
was, in no small measure, connected with the next phase of the Great 
Game—the Cold War. The British colonial authorities saw the partition 
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of colonial India as offering the possibility to remain in the northwest 
region “for an indefinite period . . . [with] British control of the vulnera-
ble North-Western . . . frontiers.”237 The northwest region was envisaged 
as “the most suitable area from which to conduct the defense” of oil sup-
plies of the Middle East, and “the keystone of the strategic arc of the 
wide and vulnerable waters of the Indian Ocean.”238 As the importance 
of oil from the Persian Gulf increased, Western powers called for a 
“close accord between the States which surround this Muslim lake, an 
accord underwritten by the Great powers whose interests are en-
gaged.”239 The Western world “went east in search of oil—and found 
Islam.”240 Pakistan, the only state in the modern world created in the 
name of Islam, was to now be turned into a frontline state of the Cold 
War, with the Durand Line to serve as the frontline. 
After cultivating close military ties with Britain and the U.S., Pakistan 
formally entered a Mutual Defense Agreement with the US and joined 
the Central Treaty Organization (“CENTO”) in 1954 and the Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organization (“SEATO”) a year later.241 It is important to 
note that British military officers retained control of Pakistan’s military, 
now seen as “the kingpin of U.S. interests,”242 for many years after deco-
lonization.243 Pakistan provided the U.S. with military bases in the 
NWFP.244 All this helped Pakistan secure recognition by Britain245 and 
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the U.S.246 of the Durand Line as a legitimate international border. As 
Pakistan consolidated its role in the anti-Communist military alliances of 
the Cold War, Afghanistan drew closer to the Soviet Union, hardened its 
position about the Durand Line, and again raised the issues of self-
determination for the Pashtuns in Pakistan and the formation of Pashtu-
nistan.247 In December, 1955, the Soviet Union declared support for the 
Afghan position regarding the Durand Line and Pashtunistan.248 
Pakistan’s assumption of the role as a frontline state in the Cold War 
had a profound impact on the political order within the country. This in-
cluded ascendency of the military as a political force, derailment of con-
stitutional governance, and centralization of political power in defiance 
of the federal architecture of the state. This turn to praetorianism had a 
direct impact on the NWFP and FATA. In 1954, the same year that Pa-
kistan formalized its partisan role in the Cold War, a “gang of four”249 
representing the military-bureaucracy combine overturned the constitu-
tional order in Pakistan, a step validated by a docile judiciary under the 
doctrine of state necessity.250 The new order then moved to erase the 
separate existence of NWFP in 1955, when the bureaucratic-military 
combine ruling Pakistan amalgamated all four provinces of the western 
wing of the country into the so-called “One Unit.”251 FATA, however, 
retained its status as a distinct federally administered zone. Afghanistan 
reacted sharply to the dissolution of NWFP and accelerated its demand 
for Pashtunistan, leading to a break in diplomatic relations.252 Trade 
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blockades and border skirmishes followed. Relations remained seriously 
strained until 1963, when the King of Afghanistan removed his prime 
minister, Sardar Daud, a Pastun and an ardent advocate of Pashtunis-
tan.253 In the meantime, strengthened and emboldened by its Cold War 
alliances, Pakistan’s military formally usurped political power by declar-
ing martial law in 1958, a move validated by the courts through a misap-
plication of Kelsen’s theory of revolutionary legality.254 In 1969, a mass-
protest movement forced the removal of Pakistan’s military dictator. The 
new government dissolved the “One Unit” and restored NWFP as a sepa-
rate province.255 FATA, however, retained its distinct dispensation. 
A serious downturn in relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan 
came in 1973, when Afghanistan declared itself a republic, and Sardar 
Daud, now its new president, revived the issue of Pashtunistan.256 Pakis-
tan immediately responded by giving sanctuary to Afghan dissidents and 
began training and arming disaffected Afghans to destabilize the new 
Afghan regime.257 From 1973-77, Pakistan trained an estimated 5,000 
Afghan militants and channeled material support to groups inside Afgha-
nistan.258 This was the beginning of Pakistan’s prolonged engagement in 
training and arming Afghan militants professing the establishment of an 
“Islamic order.”259 This also ushered in an era when the FATA, the “buf-
fer to a buffer,” became the staging ground for Pakistani military’s in-
volvement in Afghan militants’operation across the Durand Line with its 
intelligence agency Inter Services Intelligence (“ISI”) taking the lead.260 
It is important to note that this engagement was choreographed by Pakis-
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tan’s Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto, a self-professed master of geopolitics, 
who held that “geography continues to remain the most important single 
factor in the formation of a country’s foreign policy. . . . Territorial dis-
putes . . . are the most important of all disputes.”261 This was by no 
means the first instance of the use of FATA by Pakistan in its military 
strategies. As early as 1948, Pakistan had used sections of the FATA tri-
bes in its campaigns in Kashmir.262 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 dramatically accelerated 
the decline of Afghan-Pakistan relations. During the 1979–84 Afghan 
“jihad,” FATA served as a “launching pad for the mujahidin” and as a 
“base for their covert operation[s].”263 The U.S. and Saudi Arabia poured 
in $7.2 billion in covert aid for the jihad, channeled through the ISI, and 
given primarily to the most radical religious groupings, thus bypassing 
the moderate Afghan nationalists.264 The Afghan jihad furnished a justi-
fication for the tacit support by Western powers for the consolidation of 
military dictatorship in Pakistan under General Zia ul-Haq, a develop-
ment that initiated and entrenched the process of “Islamization” of Pakis-
tan.265 After the Geneva Accord of 1984 to end the Afghan conflict, and 
subsequent withdrawal of Soviet forces, Afghanistan plunged into a civil 
war, with Pakistan and other regional powers supporting different fac-
tions.266 The relative disengagement of the U.S. during this period is now 
seen by the American policy makers as a “strategic mistake.”267 
FATA continued to be used by the ISI and Afghan Islamist groups for 
their engagements in the Afghan civil war. By now, Pakistan’s military 
had developed the so-called doctrine of “strategic depth” with regards to 
Afghanistan, because it regarded India to the east as the primary military 
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threat to Pakistan’s interests. 268 In order to counter India, Pakistan, given 
its significantly smaller territorial size, sought a compliant Afghanistan 
on its western border. It was against this backdrop that Pakistan in effect 
created the Taliban in the early 1990s, a development that dramatically 
affected the Afghan civil war and, later on, the whole region.269 Pakis-
tan’s military saw continued support for the Taliban as a strategic imper-
ative.270 Pakistan’s desire to open trade routes to former Soviet Central 
Asian republics contributed to its patronage of the Taliban in Afghanis-
tan.271 Having helped the Taliban capture power in Afghanistan in 1996, 
Pakistan was among the handful of states that quickly recognized the 
new regime, and for some time even paid the salaries of the Taliban ad-
ministration in Kabul.272 Pakistan’s search for “strategic depth,” howev-
er, remained elusive. While Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic country, the 
Taliban were exclusively Pashtuns, who make up over 50% of the coun-
try’s population.273 Consequently, Pakistan’s patronage notwithstanding, 
the radical Islamic regime of the Taliban refused to accept the Durand 
Line as a legitimate international border or to drop Afghan claims over 
FATA and areas of NWFP east of the Line.274 
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Taliban’s brutal political and social order275 did not derail global geo-
politics of energy supplies, when all neighboring states and many others, 
including the U.S., started “romancing the Taliban” during a “battle for 
pipelines” in the late 1990s. 276 By the late twentieth century, global capi-
tal and its attendant state machinations had moved well beyond territorial 
colonialism to neo-imperial modes of exploitation and accumulation.277 
The spatial dimension to the cycle of accumulation, however, remained 
indispensible.278 This is particularly true of the geopolitical imperatives 
of the global energy markets.279 The break-up of the Soviet Union trig-
gered an intense competition between global oil companies and their 
sponsoring states, including the U.S. and Pakistan, to extract and trans-
port oil and gas from Central Asia via Afghanistan.280 In immediate con-
tention were two plans for alternative gas pipelines from Turkmenistan to 
run through Afghanistan: one would go to Pakistan, and the other would 
go to Iran and Turkey with a possible link to Europe. Alternatives to 
transport oil from Kazakhstan via the Caspian Sea further complicated 
the picture.281 
The events of September 11, 2001, dramatically transformed the geo-
political profile of the region. The very next day the U.S. demanded that 
Pakistan stop terrorist operatives in its border areas or “be prepared to be 
bombed back to the Stone Age.”282 Pakistan made its decision “swift-
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ly . . . [and] agreed to all . . . demands,”283also making available airbases 
and transit facilities for supplies for U.S. forces in Afghanistan.284 How-
ever, Pakistan’s military continued its special relations with the Taliban 
across the Durand Line in Afghanistan. When the U.S. launched its at-
tack on Afghanistan, the Taliban “escaped in droves into Pakistan, where 
they melted into their fellow tribesmen in the FATA.”285 After the now 
infamous “battle of Tora Bora,”286 Pakistani authorities “looked the other 
way as foreign fighters crossed over to the Pakistani side and many in the 
ISI arranged safe passage[s].”287 In collaboration with ISI, the border-
lands became a “safe haven for the Taliban and other insurgent and ter-
rorist elements.”288 FATA, long a sanctuary for fugitives from state 
law,289 now became a sanctuary and staging ground for Afghan militants 
resisting the U.S.-led war effort in Afghanistan.290 
As Pakistan’s active support of U.S. war efforts increased, Afghan mi-
litants made common cause with religious militants among the Pashtun 
tribes of FATA.291 Pakistan’s military, designed for conventional warfare 
on its eastern border with India, was “ill-prepared to tackle this new kind 
of . . . conflict that slipped across its western border.”292 As a result, Pa-
kistan vacillated between military operations against the militants and 
peace deals with them.293 In the meantime, militants started to extend 
their area of influence beyond FATA, the “buffer to a buffer,” into 
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NWFP and beyond.294 In the midst of all this, Pakistan stood firm that 
the Durand Line be recognized and respected as an international border, 
while its military considered Afghanistan “within Pakistan’s security 
perimeter.”295 On the other hand, Afghanistan continued to reject the Du-
rand Line because “it has raised a wall between the two brothers.”296 
This story of the Durand Line is a more than century-long saga of pre-
datory colonialism, postcolonial insecurities, and incessant conflict. This 
is a tale of colonial cartography bequeathed to a postcolonial formation, 
bringing in its wake bitter fruits of oppression, violence, and war. This 
leads to the broader questions of the challenges colonial borders present 
to postcolonial states and the role of international law. 
IV. COLONIAL BORDERS AND POSTCOLONIAL INSECURITIES 
Every established order tends to produce . . . the naturalization of its 
own arbitrariness.297 
A. Inherited Borders and Postcolonial State-nations 
Forged on the anvil of modern European history and enshrined in 
modern international law, modern statehood and sovereignty are deemed 
the preserve of differentiated “nations” existing within exclusive and de-
fined territories. While “the struggle to produce citizens out of recalci-
trant people accounts for much of what passes for history in modern 
times,”298 the prototype of the “nation-state” combines a singular nation-
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al identity with state sovereignty, understood as the territorial organiza-
tion of unshared political authority. “The territoriality of the nation-state” 
seeks to “impose supreme epistemic control in creating the citizen-
subject out of the individual.”299 “Inventing boundaries”300 and “imagin-
ing communities”301 work together “to naturalize the fiction of citizen-
ship.”302 Modern international law underscores this schema. It extends 
recognition only to the national form, with acceptance attached to the 
ability to hold territory in tune with “Western patterns of political organ-
ization.”303 As a result, the “nation-state” is the dominant model of orga-
nized sovereignty today. This spatially bounded construct, one that 
frames both the geography of actualizing self-determination and the or-
der of the resulting political unit, put in circulation a “territorialist 
epistemology.”304 Postcolonial formations had to subscribe to this Euro-
centric grammar of state-formation to secure eligibility in the inter-state 
legal order.305 This statist frame precludes imaginative flowerings of self-
determination in tune with the interests and aspirations of diverse com-
munities both within and beyond received colonial boundaries. 
Across the global South, colonial demarcations of zones of control and 
influence left in their wake political units lacking correspondence be-
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tween their territorial frame and the cohesion of culture and political 
identity.306 The colonial demarcations, with little regard for the history, 
culture, or geography of the region, often split cultural units or placed 
divergent cultural identities within a common boundary.307 As a conse-
quence, the crisis of the postcolonial state stems from its artificial boun-
daries and the specter of the colonial still haunt the postcolonial na-
tion.308 The “retrospective illusion”309 of nationalism remains “suspended 
forever in the space between the ex-colony and not-yet-nation.”310 Deco-
lonization movements and postcolonial states adopted and retained the 
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construct of a territorially bound “nation-state” even as they attempted to 
imagine the “nation” at variance from its European iterations.311 Impri-
soned in inherited colonial territorial cartographies, postcolonial forma-
tions inverted this grammar to produce state-nations. While conventional 
understanding assumes a preexisting nation that subsequently forms a 
state, post-colonial formations start with a territorial state that aims to 
constitute a homogenized nation. 
Building state-nations generates conflicts about minorities, ethnicities, 
ethno-nationalism, separatism, and sub-state nationalism. “[T]he nation 
dreads dissent”312 and “the nation-state’s limits implicate its geographic 
peripheries as central to its self-fashioning.”313 In the process, a co-
constitutive role of “nation and ethnicity” develops as a “productive and 
dialectical dyad.”314 It is by the construction of ethnicity as a “problem” 
that the “nation” becomes the resolution and the state incarnates itself as 
the authoritative problem solver. In this way often “the very micropolit-
ics of producing the nation are responsible for its unmaking or unrave-
ling.”315 Incessant rhetoric of endangerment and discursive production of 
threats to the nation render “nation-building” a coercive enterprise and 
facilitate the overdevelopment of the coercive apparatuses of the state.316 
While inherited boundaries represent the postcolonial state-nation’s 
“geo-body,”317 cultural and ethnic heterogeneity within induces “geo-
piety.”318 It is no surprise, then, that most postcolonial states have as 
their raison d’etre the production, maintenance, and reproduction of the 
discourses and apparatuses of national security.319 The career of Pakistan 
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as a postcolonial state circumscribed within an inherited territorial frame 
substantiates this political grammar. 
 
 Fig 3. Major Ethno-Linguistic Groups of Pakistan in relation to interna-
tional boundaries of the region320 
Pakistan, hailed as “the triumph of ideology over geography,”321 is lit-
erally caught and exists between lines drawn by colonial powers—the 
Durand Line (1893) in the northwest, the Goldsmid Line (1872) to the 
west, the Radcliffe Line (1947) in the east, and the MacMahon Line 
(1904) to the north. 322 For good measure, in the northeast, a Line of Con-
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trol, “a sequence of ellipses” “[d]rawn and redrawn by battles and trea-
ties . . . identifiable by traces of blood, bullets, watchtowers, and ghost 
settlements left from recurring wars,”323 provisionally divides Kashmir 
into areas held by India and Pakistan.324 The “state-building” and “na-
tion-building” saga that unfolded between these lines since 1947 has 
produced what is variously characterized as the “viceregal system,”325 
the “overdeveloped state,”326 the “hyper-extended state,”327 and the 
“praetorian” state.328 In efforts to constitute a state-nation, coercion al-
ways outweighed persuasion in claims of domination, in tune with a po-
litical grammar set in place by colonial rule.329 The project of “conjuring 
Pakistan,”330 that would envelop ethnic, linguistic, and cultural differ-
ences within inherited borders, necessitated deployment of “security as 
hegemony.”331 Festering territorial disputes with neighboring states fur-
nished the primary justification for the military to consume a dispropor-
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tionate share of resources and to play a leading ideological and political 
role.332 Denial of representation, suppression of federalism, and destruc-
tion of alterity are the hallmarks of the state since its inception. As suc-
cessor to the colonial “garrison state” in the Punjab, a Punjab-centered 
military-bureaucracy oligarchy retains a dominant position in the ruling 
bloc.333 Denial of equal citizenship to the people of the provinces of Ba-
lochistan, East Bengal, NWFP, and Sind—even when they constituted 
the majority of the population—remains a defining feature of the state. 
Dissent and resistance were squelched by unbridled state violence, in-
cluding repeated military actions—the most infamous being the one in 
1971 that prompted the eastern wing of Pakistan to break off and estab-
lish a separate state of Bangladesh.334 Phases of coups d’etat, martial 
laws, abrogation of constitutions, and declarations of emergency rule 
constitute the “constitutional” history of the country. A docile judiciary 
serially deployed doctrines of “state necessity,” “revolutionary legality,” 
“constitutional deviation,” and de facto power to furnish legitimacy to 
repressive orders.335 
In building a postcolonial state-nation, the FATA, the colonial “buffer 
to a buffer,” retained its special status—approximating spaces of excep-
tion as invoked by Giorgio Agamben.336 Today, FATA is “a Massachu-
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setts-sized wedge between Afghanistan and NWFP of Pakistan,” with a 
population of about 4 million, “virtually all of whom are Pashtuns.”337 
Since 1901, this zone has been governed by a unique colonial-era admin-
istrative and judicial order—an indirect rule that combines modern tech-
nologies of power with instrumental use of customary norms and tradi-
tional power structures.338 The colonial design aimed to govern through 
selected tribal notables who would be loyal to the British in exchange for 
fixed monetary allowances. No taxes would be levied on the tribes, who 
would be left alone to manage their internal affairs through the customa-
ry Pakhtunwali code in their tribal jirgas, which has been characterized 
as “probably the closest thing to Athenian democracy that has existed 
since the original.”339 However, any matter that implicated the security 
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ment for arbitration or conciliation . . . . The jirga, as it operates today, has 
three main functions. In its broadest and purest form, it regulates life at all le-
vels within a tribal society requiring community attention, e.g., the choice of a 
site for a new mosque, punishment for domestic infidelity, settlement of a 
blood feud, or a decision to take up arms against a neighboring tribe. Secondly, 
the jirga provides a mechanism by which the decisions or opinions of the tribe 
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interests of colonial authorities was to be handled by a parallel system—
a hybrid construct that retains the name jirga, but empties it of any sem-
blance to “Athenian democracy” to make room for a process and a set of 
sanctions designed for harsh control and violent discipline to facilitate 
external domination.340 This system took the shape of the Frontier 
Crimes Regulation (“FCR”), originally formulated in 1858, and amended 
in 1872 and 1901, turning FATA into a constitutional and legal anoma-
ly.341 Decolonization did not bring any change. Since 1947, FATA is 
formally a part of Pakistan.342 However FCR remains entrenched, and 
sets the FATA tribes apart from and unequal to other citizens of the 
country.343 
To enable this state and space of exception, Pakistan’s constitution re-
poses all executive and legislative authority for FATA in the President of 
Pakistan, who is given the authority to exercise his powers regarding 
FATA “as he may deem necessary.”344 Parliamentary enactments do not 
apply to FATA, unless the President so directs.345 FATA is placed out-
side the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and High Courts that other-
wise have extensive powers to guarantee fundamental rights.346 The Su-
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preme Court has recognized these “special provisions” for the area “so 
that their inhabitants are governed by laws and customs with which they 
are familiar and which suit their genius.”347 
The FATA itself stands divided into 7 administrative units styled 
“agencies.” An evocatively titled “Political Agent” (“PA”), appointed in 
each agency by the federal government and backed by a para-military 
militia, is the locus of Pakistan’s authority. Besides exercising extensive 
executive, judicial, and revenue powers, the PA is also each agency’s 
development administrator.348 He is assisted by maliks, paid intermedia-
ries from among tribal elders, who are appointed and removed at his dis-
cretion.349 Maintenance of order and suppression of crime are deemed 
the PA’s primary responsibilities.350 The PA is authorized to dispose of 
any civil or criminal matter at his discretion.351 The PA may decide the 
matter himself, or refer it to a tribal jirga, consisting of tribal maliks cho-
sen by the PA. The PA initiates cases, appoints the jirga, presides over 
trials, and the final decision is subject to his discretion.352 The jirga is 
supposed to decide the matter under FCR, supplemented by customary 
tribal norms.353 The PA retains the discretion to sentence the accused as 
determined by the jirga, refer the matter back to the jirga, or appoint a 
new jirga.354 The determinations of the PA are not subject to review by 
any court of law.355 The process is that of an inquiry rather than presenta-
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tion of evidence and cross examination. Assistance of counsel is prohi-
bited.356 
Draconian sanctions under the FCR, executed at the discretion of the 
PA, include: detention and imprisonment to prevent crime or sedition; 
requiring “a person to execute a bond for good behavior or for keeping 
the peace;” expulsion from the agency of “dangerous fanatics” and those 
involved in blood feuds; removal or prevention of settlements close to 
the border; demolition of buildings used for “criminal purposes;” collec-
tive punishment of fines and blockade; and the “right to cause the death 
of a person” on suspicion of intent to use arms to evade arrest.357 The 
federal agency charged with overseeing FATA considers FCR an “effec-
tive ‘iron-hand’” whose withdrawal would create an “administrative va-
cuum.”358 
In 1962, under a design of limited franchise, an electoral college of 
35,000 tribal maliks, appointed by the PA, selected representatives to the 
national parliament.359 In 1996, direct election of representatives was 
introduced, though “politics and political parties are curse words in offi-
cial circles.”360 Because the law prohibits political parties from extending 
their activities in FATA, only “non-party/independent” representatives 
can be elected. This makes for a unique political anomaly: FATA resi-
dents elect representatives to a legislature whose legislation does not ex-
tend to FATA. FATA also suffers from abysmal levels of poverty, illite-
racy, and lack of health care.361 Analysts find FATA “a virtual prison for 
public-spirited and reform-minded individuals. Dissenting voices are 
quickly dubbed anti-state and silenced by imprisonment.”362 State func-
tionaries, however, claim that the system in place for over a hundred 
years “suits the genius of the people and has stood the test of time.”363 It 
is more appropriate to characterize FATA as a zone where bodies and 
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spaces are placed on the other side of universality, a “moral and legal no 
man’s land, where universality finds its spatial limits.”364 
FATA, admittedly an extreme case, is symptomatic of the problem of 
reconciling territorial straitjackets with the principle of self-
determination.365 For the territorial state, self-determination has always 
been a concept “loaded with dynamite.”366 In postcolonial formations, its 
explosive potential increases. The primary problem is not how to deter-
mine identities and desires of a people eligible for self-determination;367 
the problem, rather, is how to reconcile realization of this right with ex-
isting territorial configurations. The unresolved questions surrounding 
the Durand Line, FATA, and Pashtun political identity persist because 
their resolution is sought within a territorial “nation-state.” Nesiah terms 
the imprisonment of postcolonial polities within modern territorial con-
structs of statehood “failures of the imagination.”368 A major hurdle in 
breaking free of this imprisonment is international law itself. 
B. International Law and the Territorial Straitjacket 
For many a postcolonial “contrived state”369 the crisis of identity and 
security “lies in its ‘artificiality.’”370 International law enforces the terri-
torially-bound grammar of the “nation-state” upon postcolonial forma-
tions plagued by “cartographic anxiety inscribed into [their] very genetic 
code,”371 through the doctrine of uti possidetis. Based on a maxim of 
Roman law, the doctrine of uti possidetis ita possidetis (as you possess, 
so you possess), treats the acquisition and possession of a state’s territory 
as given, with no territorial adjustments allowable without the consent of 
the currently occupying parties.372 Applied to international borders, it 
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favors actual possession irrespective of how it was achieved, assumes 
that valid title belongs to current possessor, and does not seek to diffe-
rentiate between the de facto and de jure possession.373 By recognizing 
legitimate title to de facto territorial holdings, it becomes an instrument 
to maintain the status quo and impedes imaginative resolutions of terri-
torial conflicts. 
The doctrine of uti possidetis was formulated in connection with colo-
nialism in Latin America in the early nineteenth century when Spanish 
colonies agreed to apply the principle both in their frontier disputes with 
each other and in those with Brazil.374 During the decolonization era of 
the twentieth century, this norm was extended to the withdrawal of co-
lonial powers from Asia and Africa.375 The principle mandated that “new 
States . . . come to independence with the same borders that they had 
when they were administrative units within the territory or territories of 
one colonial power.”376 This froze colonial boundaries and presented a 
challenge to postcolonial formations to imagine and manage a “nation” 
and “national identity” in the heterogeneity contained within inherited 
boundaries.377 In some instances, particularly in Africa, this attempt 
failed completely and ended in genocide and/or fracturing of the state.378 
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The ICJ379 and international tribunals380 were quick to put their impri-
matur on the doctrine of uti possidetis and its application to postcolonial 
states. The ICJ has designated it “a general principle, which is logically 
connected with the phenomenon of [] obtaining [] independence, whe-
rever it occurs.”381 The ICJ went on to state that “[i]ts obvious purpose is 
to prevent the independence and stability of new States being endangered 
by fratricidal struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers follow-
ing the withdrawal of the administering power.”382 The bottom line is 
that through “application of the principle of uti possidetis,” colonial 
“administrative boundaries” are “upgraded” and “transformed into inter-
national frontiers in the full sense of the term.”383 
The ICJ acknowledged that by giving fixity and legitimacy to colonial 
boundaries, the principle uti possidetis “at first sight . . . conflicts out-
right with another one, the right of peoples to self-determination.”384 In 
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the face of this dilemma, the ICJ fell back on pragmatism to claim that 
“maintenance of the territorial status quo” is essential to “preserve what 
has been achieved by peoples who have struggled for their indepen-
dence.”385 The Court sought support for this claim with a gesture toward 
the practice of post-colonial states: 
[t]he essential requirement of stability in order to survive, to develop 
and gradually to consolidate their independence in all fields, has in-
duced African States judiciously to consent to the respecting of colonial 
frontiers, and to take account of it in the interpretation of the principle 
of self-determination.386 
Here Nesiah rightly sees a “double bind” infecting the Court as it is 
committed to decolonization but “[t]erritorial integrity emerges here as a 
statist spatial representation intelligible to international law, and posited 
as indispensible to the self-determination of the postcolony.”387 
As the saga of the Durand Line shows, colonial frontiers, boundaries, 
and borders fluctuated over time. This raises the question of the exact 
territorial bounds of postcolonial states. The ICJ injected an unequivocal 
temporal cut-off in this historically ambivalent temporal and spatial is-
sue, by holding that: 
[U]ti possidetis—applies to the new State (as a State) not with retroac-
tive effect, but immediately and from that moment onwards. It applies 
to the State as it is, i.e., to the photograph of the territorial situation 
then existing. The principle of uti posidetis freezes the territorial title; it 
stops the clock but does not put back the hands.388 
As fashioned by the ICJ: 
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the critical date as a legal concept posits that there is a certain moment 
at which the rights of the parties crystallize, so that acts after that date 
cannot alter the legal position. It is a moment which is more decisive 
than any other for the purpose of the formulation of the rights of the 
parties in question.389 
This freeze-framing of boundaries on the date of decolonization by one 
definitive gesture renders the issue of the history of these boundaries 
moot. The rationale appears to be that “freezing the carved-up territory in 
the format it exhibited at the moment of independence”390 will deter ter-
ritorial disputes among post-colonial states. Pervasive postcolonial terri-
torial and self-determination conflicts, however, reveal that such a man-
dated spatial fixity and temporal clarity of boundaries does not keep 
these conflicts in check.391 Uti posidetis combined with critical date as a 
legal concept trumps conflicting post-colonial assertion and exercise of 
effective authority as grounds for sovereign title under the doctrine of 
effectivites.392 Post-colonial effectivities has significance only if colonial 
practice fails to furnish definitive demarcation and thus trigger applica-
tion of uti posseditis.393 
The concern with order has been central to modern international 
law.394 Decolonization, coming on the heels of two World Wars, raised 
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the specter of disorder. As a result, the norm of self-determination gave 
way to the caveat of order.395 Order trumped self-determination, deemed 
a concept “loaded with dynamite,”396 and the transition from colonialism 
to postcoloniality proceeded with the basic requirement that external 
boundaries remain in place. Managers of postcolonial formations were 
equally quick to subscribe to the doctrine, and international bodies like 
the United Nations were quick to give their imprimatur. The same 1960 
UN resolution that affirmed that “[a]ll peoples have the right of self-
determination,” also declared that “[a]ny attempt aimed at the partial or 
total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a country 
is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations.”397 As a way out of this contradiction, the United Na-
tions contemplates the possibility of non-state modes of actualizing self-
determination, by holding that “[t]he establishment of a sovereign and 
independent State, the free association or integration with an independent 
State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined 
by a people constitutes modes of implementing the right of self-
determination.”398 This contradiction points to the Janus-faced nature of 
the right of self-determination in a system of states with fixed and inviol-
able territorial bounds. The right has a “justifying, stabilizing, conserving 
effect and it has a criticizing, subversive, revolutionizing one.”399 Inter-
national law and the practice of states have been content with the justify-
ing, stabilizing, and conserving effect.400 
This bias in favor of existing states is augmented by a doctrinal lacuna, 
with profound political implications, that remains at the heart of the uti 
possidetis doctrine as reformulated by modern international law and en-
dorsed by the ICJ. In jus civile, rightful title via de facto possession could 
only be acquired by a prescriptive claim of usucapio established in good 
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faith.401 Furthermore, in Roman law, uti possidetis is deemed an interim 
measure in contested vindication proceedings to determine title.402 A crit-
ical restrictive qualifier, nec vi, nec clam, nec precario (without force, 
without secrecy, without permission), limits the scope of the doctrine. 
Possession would ripen into good title only if possession did not run 
afoul of the limitations. Modern international law conveniently elides 
this critical limitation, perhaps because given the colonial modes of ac-
quisition of territory, colonial boundaries run afoul of it.403 This gloss 
over the spatial history of colonialism, now bequeathed to post-colonial 
formations, by treating de facto control as rightful title is a foundational 
reworking of the original construct.404 
The doctrine of uti possidetis, far from being grounded in any sound 
legal principle, is thus more a political instrument to legitimize existing 
state boundaries. The precarious status of the norm was underscored by 
the Beagle Channel Arbitration’s observation that it is “possibly, at least 
at first, a political tenet rather than a true rule of law.”405 Koskenniemi 
sees in the recognition of uti possidetis an acknowledgment that the ethi-
cal conception of international law cannot override the sociological.406 
Demarcation of boundaries is, essentially, a political act. However, when 
reified by international law, these boundaries appear to have an identity 
separate from politics of the international system. The primary rationale 
for the adoption of the principle has been to avoid territorial conflict 
among post-colonial states, particularly in the light of international law’s 
primary role—preservation of order.407 While peace and order remain 
elusive in the global system, uti possidetis furnishes a cloak of legitimacy 
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over colonial disposition of territories of the global South by sidestep-
ping the questions of the origins of these dispositions. By forcing dispa-
rate people to circumscribe their political aspirations within predeter-
mined territorial bounds, uti possidetis reverses the vision of self-
determination that seeks to protect vulnerable populations by allowing 
them political and territorial arrangements of their own.408 Ian Brownlie 
is unequivocal in stating that “it is uti possidetis which creates the ambit 
of the pertinent unit of self-determination, and which in that sense has a 
logical priority over self-determination.”409 The problem is that this logi-
cal priority furnishes the grounds for actually giving territory priority 
over people when confronted with assertions of the right of self-
determination. 
C. Colonial Boundaries, Unequal Treaties, and International Law 
Treaties between imperial powers and a variety of agreements between 
colonizers and native authorities played a key role in determining the 
spatial scope of spheres of control and influence.410 The Durand Line, 
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like borders of most postcolonial states, is a legacy of such treaties, par-
ticularly the 1893 agreement between the Afghan Amir and the Brit-
ish.411 As disputes arise about the validity of these borders, questions 
about the legal status of the treaties that determined these borders sur-
face. Most salient among these is the issue of unequal treaties. However, 
in tune with its gloss on the doctrine of uti possidetis to protect the status 
quo, modern international law has similarly resisted confronting the 
question of unequal treaties for the same purpose. 
The Durand Line raises the question of the validity of the 1893 agree-
ment dictated by the British to the reluctant Amir of Afghanistan, a vas-
sal installed over a protectorate in all but name.412 While examining the 
validity of such arrangements, one is confronted with the fact that the 
question of unequal treaties appears to have “evaporated as an issue from 
the domain of international law,” and stands “consigned to the dustbin of 
‘redundant ideas,’”413 deemed a mere “political” argument with scant 
legal valance.414 How does a question implicated in colonial territorial 
treaties that imprison the postcolonial world in arbitrary spatial cages 
become invisible to international law? It took a series of conceptual and 
institutional maneuvers to make it disappear from sight. 
The status of unequal treaties415 in international law first arose in the 
nineteenth century in the context of treaties between Western powers and 
East Asian states416 and was rehearsed in the early twentieth century by 
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Soviet jurists.417 Drawing on extra-textual contexts that animated the 
texts of colonial treaties, Asian states and Soviet jurists argued that be-
cause imperial powers had used their dominant military position to gain 
concessions through treaties forced upon weaker states, such treaties 
were invalid. Because these agreements were the products of coercion, 
they implicated questions of status of parties, the context in which 
agreements were secured, and the nature of consent involved. The issue 
of inequality arises both in terms of unequal bargaining power of the par-
ties and the substantive lack of equilibrium with respect to benefits and 
burdens allocated by these treaties. Note here that in some instances, the 
harsh and humiliating terms of unequal treaties were instrumental in the 
rise of anti-colonial resistance and nationalism in Asia and unprecedent-
ed collective military action by Western powers to quell this resis-
tance.418 Indeed it was the coordinated military action in China by West-
ern powers to put down the anti-Western Boxer Uprising of 1900 that 
fashioned a new and enduring stratagem of international politics—
collective military action by the Western powers in the global South.419 
Faced with questions about the validity of unequal treaties, the initial 
Western response was that these treaties were necessary given the 
“backwardness” of Asian societies and legal orders, and that once those 
“shortcomings” are remedied, the treaties will lose their force by the ab-
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sence of their raison d’être.420 By the late nineteenth century, interna-
tional law’s turn to positivism, with its recognition of differentiated sove-
reignties, stepped in to acknowledge and accommodate a diplomatic 
practice rooted in culture and history as the primary source of norms.421 
The contemporary Concert of Europe rested upon the Act of the Vienna 
Congress (1815), the peace treaty at the culmination of the Napoleonic 
Wars, and related agreements.422 Preservation of the Concert of Europe 
and the attendant distribution of power became a primary preoccupation 
of international law.423 Since peace treaties are unavoidably unequal in 
nature, international law now framed the question of sovereign consent 
as a purely formal one subject to overarching norms of preservation of 
order in the international system.424 The classic notion that validity of 
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treaties rests upon consent by formally equal and sovereign states gave 
way to a positivist recognition that “[t]he obligation of treaties, by what-
ever denomination they may be called, is founded, not merely upon the 
contract itself, but upon those mutual relations between the two states, 
which may have induced them to enter into certain engagements.”425 Po-
litical realities trumped formal legal categories now deemed quaint. In 
this frame, unequal treaties of yesterday, however secured, furnished the 
grounds of the prevailing international order. To question their validity 
retrospectively raised the specter of unraveling the fragile order of 
things. With the question of state consent rendered a formal one, today 
any arguments based on consent to explain validity of treaties become 
“deceptively simple. . . . [because t]heir theoretical power lies in the sug-
gestion that perhaps nothing really needs to be justified.”426 
International lawyers deployed the same line of reasoning to defang the 
classic doctrine of ribus sic stantibus (things thus standing), whereby a 
fundamental change of circumstances can justify unilateral termination 
of treaties. Unequal treaties are particularly vulnerable to this line of at-
tack with the passage of time and changes in the post-Napoleonic Euro-
pean balances of power.427F427 When the issue arose within Europe in the 
late nineteenth century, international law’s response was that because 
sanctity of treaties is essential to the maintenance of order, even in the 
face of changed circumstances, termination or modification of treaty ob-
ligations requires the consent of other parties.428F428 As pressure for revision 
of treaty arrangements mounted, in light of a changed balance of power 
within Europe in the early twentieth century, international law’s turn to 
institutions to deal with problems of order, now seen as essentially politi-
cal in nature, provided an opening—signaling “a movement from a mo-
ment of law to politics.”429F429 The doctrine of ribus sic stantibus was now 
read as embracing two separate issues to be framed and resolved along 
two separate tracks. The political issue of accommodating changes in the 
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interests and powers of states was to be dealt with by the League of Na-
tions under article 19 of its Charter.430 The legal issue was to be narrowly 
construed as one of clausula—the relationship between underlying con-
sent and changed circumstances—deemed suitable for judicial determi-
nation by the Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”).431 As 
now enshrined in article 62 of the Vienna Convention, the doctrine of 
rebus sic stantibus stands confined within narrow limits as a legal ques-
tion—a treaty is terminable only when unforeseen changes in the cir-
cumstances underlying the conclusion of the treaty transform radically 
the extent of the obligations still to be performed.432 In the end, rebus sic 
stantibus stands sacrificed at the altar of pacta sunt servanda (agree-
ments must be kept). 
International law deals with the issue of coercion, duress, and unequal 
treaties with institutional and interpretive moves. The Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties addresses the issue through articles 51 and 
52—making coercion and threat or use of force “in violation of the prin-
ciples of international law in the Charter of the United Nations” grounds 
for voiding a treaty.433 With this iteration of a classic rule, “the problem 
has been legislated away.”434 The repackaging of what coercion, threat, 
or use of force is impermissible subtly altered the classic treaty law rule 
on duress that condemned all coercion. The prohibition on duress in the 
formation of a treaty now stands conditioned by the legal status of the 
coercion used. The qualifier “in violation of international law” on the 
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prohibition against the threat or use of force is to be read in the light of 
the U.N. Charter that does not outlaw use of force, only unlawful use of 
force.435 Consequently, with unequal treaties of the past, the question 
becomes not the exercise of coercion and duress, but one of the legal sta-
tus of threat or use of force in the eye of international norms in place at 
the time the treaties were made. The imperial bent of international law in 
the colonial age already stood recognized and legitimated by the positiv-
ist turn that international law took.436 The implication is that any alleged 
use of force in treaties of the past may well have been lawful under con-
temporaneous norms. For good measure, the ICJ has held that any accu-
sation of coercion to dispute the validity of a treaty must be accompanied 
by “clear evidence” that goes beyond, e.g., the mere presence of naval 
forces off the coast of the complaining party.437 This narrow definition of 
coercion is particularly troubling in today’s global order where effective 
instruments of economic coercion increasingly complement weapons of 
physical coercion in relations between states.438 In the face of these con-
ceptual and institutional moves, any continuing expectation that interna-
tional law as it stands may interrogate unequal colonial treaties to rescue 
territorially imprisoned postcolonial formations is futile. To those who 
may still raise the question of unequal treaties, Brierly has an unequivoc-
al response: “we must not invent a pseudo-legal principle to justify such 
action. The remedy has to be sought elsewhere, in political, not in juridi-
cal action.”439 While the question of colonial unequal treaties stands 
brushed aside, what about contemporary treaties that reflect existing in-
ternational relations of domination? Here, it appears that it is sufficient to 
acknowledge that “bargaining frequently takes place in a world of un-
even resources and opportunity costs,”440 and move on. 
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The history of unequal treaties underscores that “the history of the in-
ternational system is a history of inequality par excellence.”441 Interna-
tional law’s posture towards legacies of colonialism has created a “lega-
lized hegemony: the realization through legal forms of Great Power pre-
rogatives.”442 The fleeting and ephemeral career of the unequal treaties 
doctrine in international law underscores an apparently foundational ca-
non of the law: the specter of disorder necessitates defense of order, even 
an unjust order. This is in tune with Kant, author of the celebrated foun-
dational injunction of the Enlightenment—“dare to know”—who dec-
laimed that: 
The origin of supreme power, for all practical purposes, is not disco-
verable by the people who are subject to it. In other words, the subject 
ought not to indulge in speculations about its origin with a view to act-
ing upon them, as if its right to be obeyed were open to doubt . . . . 
[W]hether the power came first, and the law only appeared after it, or 
whether they ought to have followed this order—these are completely 
futile arguments for a people which is already subject to civil law, and 
they constitute a menace to the state.443 
International law, like modern law itself, is not so daring after all. It 
turns out that its primary function is to enable “[s]tates to carry on their 
day-to-day intercourse along orderly and predictable lines.”444 It is of 
little concern to it that the lines within which states have to exist in order 
“to carry out their day-to-day intercourse” are unstable, contested, and 
fruits of the exercise of imperial domination. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Modern colonialism was nothing if not an exercise in audacity. The 
global reach of colonial rule reordered subjects and reconfigured space. 
Fixed territorial demarcations of colonial possessions played a pivotal 
role in this process. Issuing from imperatives of colonial rule and com-
pulsions of rivalries between colonial powers, these demarcations often 
cut across age-old cultural and historical social units. Postcolonial states 
inherited these demarcations and, with them, a host of endemic political 
and security afflictions. The unmistakable spatiality of the so-called 
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Great Games, both old and new, brings into relief the continuing salience 
of space and territory in an age when the forces and processes of globali-
zation had supposedly rendered them irrelevant. 
Modern international law, which in its incipient stage lent license to 
colonial rule, today legitimates colonial cartographies, thereby accentuat-
ing postcolonial dilemmas and conflicts. This accords with the larger 
affliction that plagues international law: its refusal to squarely face its 
complicity in the process of empire building combines with its inability 
to break free of the shadow of a sordid past. The career of the Durant 
Line highlights that when addressing many of today’s intractable con-
flicts, the law as it exists is more of a problem than a solution. As hu-
manity struggles to imagine political communities beyond the straitjack-
ets of territorial states, a primary challenge is to clear the conceptual and 
doctrinal hurdles that remain in the way. This necessitates breaking free 
of imperial geographies and economies of knowledge that undergird 
modern legal constructs and international regimes. Albert Einstein cau-
tioned us that “it is theory which decides what can be observed.” The 
first step in that direction is to align our inquiries and sights with the oth-
er side of the lines drawn by international law. 
 
